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



PRESENTED BY

Miss Sarah Madeline Hodge


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




X

Systematic
Zoology

London 1829



Charles Hodge

Systematic
Theology.

Princeton Jan. 1818.

Salutis Catena.

Deus ordinavit.

Christus meruit.

Verbum promittit.

Sacramenta obsignant.

Fides recipit.

Ps fatetur.

Opera testantur.

Philosophy Of the Mind.

Q. What is Truth.

A. Truth which is ^{the} object of all science, scarcely admits of a strict definition. Deatlie says, that is, Truth which the constitution of our nature determines us to believe, and that is Falsehood which the constitution of our nature determines us to disbelieve.

Q. Is the mind of man capable of attaining any certain knowledge?

A. Yes. The supposition that it can be proved that all human knowledge can be is uncertain, destroys itself, for taking it for granted, that the uncertainty of our knowledge, can be certainly known. No man can be a consistent universal sceptic for he would have to doubt of the reality

of his doubting every thing.

Q. Are there innate ideas in the mind of man?

A. No. If we understand this phrase as used by Mr Locke, who considered it as meaning certain impressions or notions existing in the mind previous to, and independent of, reflection and sensation. It is one thing however to say that men have an innate knowledge of such and such things, and another to say they have an aptitude to receive them. The mind is not a Tabula Rasa.

Q. Are there any self evident or intuitive truths.

A. Yes. Those propositions which from the constitution of our nature I am under the necessity of believing as soon as they are presented to my mind, are cal

led self-evident truths. Or that is an ultimate principle, which forceth our belief by its own intrinsic evidence and which cannot by any reasoning be rendered more evident.

Q. On what evidence does the belief of our existence rest?

A. We have no other direct evidence of our existence than that of consciousness. Tho' strictly speaking existence is not the object of consciousness. But we are conscious of our thoughts. That which does not exist cannot think. In this view Des Cartes' Cogito ergo sum is correct.

Q. On what evidence do we believe that the world exists?

A. On the testimony of our external senses we cannot help believing it.

Q. Why do ^{we} believe what we distinctly remember?

A. We can give no other reason than that such is the constitution of our nature that we are under the necessity of believing what we distinctly remember, as well as what we perceive, or are conscious of.

8 B. Why do we believe in Testimony.

A. Our belief is not the result of experience, but arises from the constitution of our nature.

9 B. Into how many kinds may first truths be divided? A. 1st The existence of the objects of sense & consciousness, 2^d Axioms or self-evident truths, as mathematical axioms, 3 Philosophical principles, as that every effect must have a cause. 4 Moral truths, 5 Truths reported to us by a competent number of witnesses, past or present. 6 Truths founded on uniform experience, as that the Sun will rise to-morrow. 7 Those founded on Memory.

10 B. Can their number be ascertained. No.

11 B. How can they be distinguished from

vulgar prejudices. ^{Q.} The essential qualities of first Truths are 1st They are incapable of proof or disproof, as all other truths are less clear and certain. 2. Admitted in all countries and at all times. 3. They are practically followed even by contrary theorists. With respect to many we can be certain that they belong to this class, with regard to others it may be doubted whether they are known by the faculty of common sense, or by a short process of reasoning.

Q. Can there be any reasoning with those ^{who} deny them? A. No. For there can be no reasoning without premises, and these in the first instance must be self-evident. Reasoning is the comparison of ideas already known and thereby inferring others before unknown. If some things are not admitted without proof we would have to reason on ad in finitum.

Q. Can intuitive truths be always easi

by distinguished from the deductions
of Reason? A. No.

4 Q. Are there such truths necessary in
every science? In every science there must
be some truths self-evident, or we could
never commence our investigations.

5 Q. Are the conclusions of reasoning more
certain than first principles? No. For
these conclusions derive all their strength
from the premises or principles from
which they are drawn. The superstructure
can not have more stability than
the foundation.

6 Q. Can our belief in these principles
be shaken by reasoning? No. Though we
may be unable to answer the arguments
of Sophisters against them, yet we can't
withhold our assent from what is self
evident if we try.

7 Q. How does it appear that matter and
mind are essentially different? If the
word matter be taken in the sense in which

it is used in Natural Philosophy, there can be no doubt on the subject. For of all the properties essential to matter, not one, can be predicated of mind, and of those essential to mind, not one can be predicated of matter. Therefore the substances to which these properties belong must be essentially different.

- Q. Could omnipotence endow matter with the power of thinking? No. It implies a contradiction. It is the same as to ask whether a being can be essentially active & essentially inactive at the same time.
- Q. Are our ideas of mind as clear as those of matter? A. Yes, our ideas of each are confined to their properties, and are as clear in the one case as the other.
- Q. What is Perception and what are the immediate objects of the mind in perception?
- A. Perception is the means by which the mind keeps up its intercourse with external things. Considered as an act of the mind it requires

These three particulars 1st Some notion of the object perceived 2nd an irresistible conviction of its present existence 3^d This conviction is immediate and not the result of reasoning. The objects of the mind in perception are the qualities of bodies with certain states and conditions of our own bodies, mechanical powers chemical powers &c &c. Every object of Perception must have a real existence must be external & must be present.

Q. What was long the opinion of philosophers on this subject? It was long supposed that species, forms, phantasms, or ideas were the immediate objects of Perception.

Q. To what scepticism did this opinion lead? A. Berkeley's taking for granted that all the objects of our knowledge were ideas, proved that the material world does not exist. And Hume setting out with dividing all the Perceptions

Hume
of the human mind, into impressions and ideas, and by asserting that the latter differs from the former only in being a weaker perception. comes at last to the conclusion that, "mankind" (both soul and body) are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux or movement."

23 Q. Can we explain how the impressions on the organs of sense produce perception.

A. No. a certain sensation is always followed by a certain perception, but how or why we can not tell. Dr Hume has attempted to explain it on the principle of nervous vibrations.

24 Q. What is sensation and how distinguished from perception? A. Sensation is distinguished from every other act of the mind, in having no object, distinct from the act itself. Its essence con

sists in being felt. Sensation is related to Perception as the sign to the thing signified. Sensation taken by itself does not imply the belief of any thing external, but Perception does. Sensation supposes a sentient being and a particular way in which that being is affected, but nothing more. Perception supposes something distinct from the mind which perceives and the act of Perception.

25 Q. What is consciousness? It is an involuntary act, and signifies ^{the} immediate knowledge, we must of necessity have of all the present operations of our minds. It regards only what is present and also what is in the mind.

26 Q. What is judgement? A. That act of the mind by which one thing is affirmed of another or denied of another.

27 Q. What is Memory? A. That faculty by which we have an immediate

knowledge of things past. It implies the capacity of retaining knowledge, and also a power of recalling it to our thoughts.
Q. What is reasoning? A. That power of the mind, by which we draw inferences, or by which we are convinced, that a relation belongs to two ideas, on account of our having found, that these ideas bear certain relations to other ideas.

Q. Do we always give an implicit belief to Memory? A. Yes. We are forced by the constitution of our nature to believe what we distinctly remember, and we can't help it if we would.

Q. Does Memory never deceive us? A. No, we are sometimes at a loss to know whether we remember or not, but it is impossible that ^{what} we do remember should be not be true. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish, Mem. & Imagination

31 Q. What is conception and what Imagination? A. Conception, is that power of the mind, by which we are able to form a notion, of our past sensations, or of absent objects of perception. Its business is to present the mind with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. Fancy selects and presents to Imagination all the materials it requires, and Imagination is the power of so modifying these materials, or in other words our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones together, so as to form new wholes of our own creation. see App. p. 3.

32 Q. What is attention and should it be reckoned a distinct faculty? A. Attention is the fixance of the mind on a particular object. when this object is external, it is called Attention, but receives the appellation of Reflexion when the object is within. It is not a distinct ^{faculty}

33 Q. What is Abstraction? A. Abstraction is the faculty by which we resolve or analyse a subject into its known attributes, or it is the power of considering certain qualities apart from the rest.

34 Q. Are there any general conceptions? A. Yes. and these are formed by the power of abstraction, separating from individuals, their attributes, and then by the faculty of generalization collecting such as are common to a number into one idea. In this way our notions of genera & species are formed.

51 Q. For what do general terms stand in reasoning? A. In regard to this point there have been three different opinions, the advocates of which have respectively been called Realists, Nominalists and Conceptualists. Plato and Aristotle though ^{they} differed in some particulars relative to this subject, both taught, that there were certain substantial forms or essences con-

responding to general terms, and ~~at~~
the mind contemplated when it used
these terms. Leno and his followers
of the stoical sect held on the contra-
ry that universals had neither form
nor essence, but that they were mere
nominal representations of particular
objects. The doctrine of Aristotle pre-
vailed generally, untill the 11th centu-
ry when Boetius embraced the o-
pinion of the Stoics, and together with
his pupil Abelard, greatly spread the
doctrine of the Nominalists. Conceptu-
alists differ materially from both the
preceding. They maintain that as words
are connected, by common consent, with
certain attributes, common to many
individuals, that as soon as a general
term is pronounced, all these attributes
are brought before the mind by the fa-
culty of conception, and that this col-

lection of ideas, (or conception) is the object contemplated when general terms are employed.

36 Q. In the use of general terms does the mind always think of an individual? A. No.

37 Q. What is association & what is its importance? Association is the tendency of the mind to pass from one thought to another on account of some relation between ^{them}. It is of the greatest importance as it has great influence in regulating the succession of our thoughts, and by the indispolable combinations it leads us to form in our infancy and youth effects both on our intellectual powers, and moral characters. See Ap. p. 4.

38 Q. What is Conscience, and is it an original faculty? A. There are three different opinions on this subject. 1st Some consider Conscience, not only as an orig.

inal but also, an independent faculty, so
that the decisions of conscience and the
understanding may be directly opposed
to each other; and that Conscience is
always right. 2^d That it is neither orig-
inal nor uniform, that it would permit
men to determine that injustice, & in-
gratitude, are morally right but that
utility prevents their making such dis-
cisions. 3^d That it is an original, but not
an independent faculty, involving in
every act the exercise of the understand-
ing, together with an approving or dis-
approving emotion of the heart. See A. p. 4.

Q. Is it properly called the Moral Sense?

A. Moral Sense refers as much to the ac-
tions of others, as to our own. Conscience
refers only to our own. The latter is the
exercise of the former on a particular
class of objects. Yet Conscience is often
used in the extended sense of the first
of these terms.

40 Q. Is it uniform in its dictates? A. Yes with
in certain limits i.e. as there are ^{1st} principles
in every science, so in morals there are some
things so plain that men never differ
in regard to them. But when we leave
these, the decisions of Conscience become as
various and inconsistent, as the conclusions
of reason on points of mere speculation.

41 Q. Is Conscience distinct from the understand-
ing? A. No it is the exercise of the under-
standing on moral subjects, accompanied
by a feeling of the heart, as to their being
right or wrong.

42 Q. Is there any thing more in Conscience
than a judgement of the understanding?
A. Yes, see the foregoing answers.

43 Q. How can the diversity in the operation
of conscience be accounted? A. In the same
way as we account for the vast diversity
in the operations of other original facul-
ties, such as taste and judgement. Men of

ten agree in a moral principle though they er in its application. Thus one nation approves of parricide, while another reprobates it; yet the consciences of both teach that we ought to do good to our Parents.

44 Q. What are simple ideas & what are complex ideas? A. A simple idea, is an idea of a simple object, i.e. of an object ~~that cannot be~~ without parts, or it is an idea that cannot be resolved into two or more ideas. - A Complex idea arises from the combination of two or more simple ideas, or it is an idea of a complex object.

45 Q. Are all our simple ideas derived from sensation and reflection? A. Such is the general opinion of philosophers. but it is difficult in this way to account for our ideas of identity of unity & duration &c. &c. see A. p. 4.

461 Q. What is Theology? A. It is that system or body of doctrine concerning God and divine things revealed by God, for his own glory, and man's salvation.

47 Q. In what sense was the word used by heathen authors? A. They used it as synonymous with Metaphysics. Aristotle divides Theolog Philosophy into natural, mathematical, and Theological.

48 Q. How was it used by the Fathers of the christian church? A. They applied the term particularly, to that part of the christian doctrine which treated of the divinity of our Saviour. Hence John is called by them Theologus.

49 Q. How is Theology divided? A. Into true and false. True Theology is divided into that of vision, and that of revelation, the latter again is divided into natural and supernatural. A. into Natural & Revealed.

50 Q. What is natural Theology? A. It consists in the knowledge of those truths concerning the being and attributes God, the principles of human duty, and the expectation of a future state derived from Reason alone.

51 Q. How does it appear that there is any natural Theology? A. It is proved from man's having a natural law written in his conscience Rom 9. 14. from all nations having some religion, and from its being so congenial to our minds.

52 Q. Is that Theology sufficient to lead men to the true knowledge of God? It may lead us to the knowledge of God as Creator, preserver and governor, and to the knowledge of those attributes manifested in the works of God, but it can not make us acquainted with his character as Redeemer, and as a God who forgiveth iniquity transgression, and sin.

30 Q Has natural Theology been held in its purity by any nation destitute of Revelation.
A. No, and it is remarkable that the progress of corruption in the doctrines of religion have been in exact proportion to the advance of nations in the arts and sciences.

54 Q. Would a perfect knowledge of natural Theology give any hope to a sinner?
A. No, it cannot disclose the plan according to which God can be just and yet justify the ungodly, and therefore can afford no rational hope that God will pardon sin.

55 Q How do men acquire the idea of a God?
A. The mind of man is so formed, that though it has no innate ideas of God, nor any intuitive perception of his existence, yet it has a faculty well suited to receive this truth, so that when it is proposed it easily and readily apprehends it. This differs from Des Cartes ^{notion} ~~idea~~ of an

innate idea only in making it necessary that the truth should be proposed to the mind. This knowledge of a Deity has probably been preserved in the world by Tradition, without this men would be atheists.

56. Q. How can the existence of God be demonstrated? The arguments for the Being of God have generally been divided into those a priori & those a posteriori. It has also been argued from the universal & uninterrupted consent of all nations, from the aptitude of our minds to receive this truth, from the operations of natural Conscience.

57. Q. What is the nature of the argument a priori? A. It consists in arguing from cause to effect. It begins with establishing our own existence from consciousness. That we are not necessarily existent, therefore must have a cause. That something must have existed from all eternity, or nothing could ever have existed, that this be-

ing must exist by an internal necessity of nature; that what exists necessarily must exist alike every where, must be perfect, act every where, &c. This however very generally doubted whether this argument has any foundation, or whether it is at all conclusive, Dr Sam. Clark's demonstration is the most ingenious, and learned specimen of this method of arguing. vide Dr A. lecture.

58 Q. What is the nature of the argument a posteriori? A. It is reasoning from the effect to the cause. it is founded on the principle that every effect must have a cause, and whatever excellency is found in the ~~cause~~ ^{effect} must exist in a much greater degree in the cause.

59 Q. How is the existence of God proved from the structure of the universe? A. The works of nature prove the existence of God by their Production, Harmony, Preservation. & adaptation to their ends.

Design wherever manifested is an unanswerable proof of a direct ^{ing} intelligence.

60 Q. How is this truth established from a consideration of the body of man? A. By the order and fitness of every part. "we are fearfully and wonderfully made" and from the admirable difference of the features of men.

61 Q. What is the force of the argument from general consent? The universality and uninterruptedness of the ~~belief~~ ^{belief} in the existence of God, is a phenomenon which nothing but the truth of the fact can solve! Particularly when we consider that all wicked men must wish it were not so. The idea of a God is not derived either from sensation or reflection, its existence in the breasts of men can only be accounted for, by supposing it to be received by tradition from the first man, who must have received it from God himself.

62 Q. Can any argument be drawn from miracles in favour of this truth? A. No. thing very conclusive, as it is more difficult to establish the truth of a miracle than of the divine existence.

63. How does the existence of Conscience prove the Being of a God? A. There is a law in the human mind, which in some measure is the rule of good & evil, this law must have a lawgiver, the transgression of this law excites the dread of punishment, and this operation of Conscience is universal, regarding even the most secret acts of wickedness: moreover men cannot free themselves from the authority of Conscience however much they may desire it.

64 Q. In what argument did Des Cartes depend for the proof of this truth? A. He held that the idea of God was impressed on the mind of man by the Deity himself. And that as we have

an idea of an infinite Being, that of which, this idea, is the type, must also exist.

65 In what way do Atheists attempt to evade the arguments in proof of a God?

A. Modern Atheists endeavoured to maintain the eternity of the world, and its inhabitants; ancient Atheist admitting the world was formed in time, deny that it is the work of an intelligent agent, but the result of a fortuitous course of atoms.

66. Q How can it be demonstrated that the world is not from eternity? A. 1st

From the continual changes constantly occurring before our eyes. 2^d From the Natural History of the world. 3 From the late origin of the arts and sciences 4 From there being neither history nor monument, indicating the world to be older than 5 or 6 thousand years. 5 From the decay of the centrifugal force.

67 Q How can the absurdity of an infinite succession of dependent ^{beings} be proved? A. It is proved by the argument of the chain of an infinite number of links, which it would be absurd to say supported itself, when we cannot discover the least tendency to selfsupport, though we ascend it as high as our thoughts can reach. or, we may argue, thus, When a man is brought into being the whole cause necessary to produce this effect must ~~also~~ at that time, begin existence. but when a man is born his immediate parents ^{only} it may be of all his progenitors are in existence, therefore all the cause necessary for the production of a human being resides in his parents. quod est absurdum.

68 Q Have there been any speculative Atheists? A. Yes some few among both the ancient and modern philosophers have professed themselves to be Atheists. Atheism has even had its martyrs. Lucilio Vanini

a native of Naples, and teacher of Atheism in France, was condemned and executed at Toulouse A.D. 1619.

69. Q How do you know that God is a being of infinite perfection? It is a dictate of nature, a first principle, which must be taken for granted and which indeed it is included in the very definition of the term - God.

70. Q How can this be reconciled with the prevalency of idolatry and Polytheism?

A. It is very difficult to remove all the difficulties arising from these sources to ~~the~~ this opinion. The difficulty may be lessened by remarking 1. That the Heathen in worshipping images, (at least in the first instance) considered them merely as the habitations of their Deity. 2 That those Gods to whom, they ascribed principles and actions inconsistent with perfection, were merely intermediate Deities. 3 That from the corruption of human

nature, superstition has obtained such power, as to make men believe and act in opposition to, even the first principles of reason. & That they received implicitly the religious opinions of their forefathers without enquiring, or thinking for themselves.

y. Q. Is the unity of God a dictate of natural Theology? A. If we admitted that it is taught by the light of nature, that God is infinitely perfect, it must follow that nature teaches his unity, as infinite perfection excludes the idea of superiority or equality in any other being. Besides we have clear evidence of the existence of one God, but see no proof of more than one.

y. Q. How is the spirituality of God demonstrated? A. It is demonstrated he is entirely different from matter, as matter is inert essentially, but God must be active essentially. Spirit is the noblest, Sub-

stances with which we are acquainted, we therefore ascribed it to God from the principle recognized above.

73. Q. How is the omnipotence of God proved? A. It is proved by creation;—there is no indication of want of power, to be discovered in the universe.

74. Q. How does it appear that he is wise?

A. It is manifested by the variety and beauty of his works, by the fitness of creatures for their end, and in the subordination of one creature to another.

Wisdom is the right use of knowledge.

75. Q. Can his omnipresence be demonstrated by reason? A. Were God not capable of perceiving and acting in all places at all times, he must be limited, & possessed only of finite knowledge.

76. Q. Does the goodness of God appear evident from his works? It is manifested in the provision he has made for the happiness of his creatures, in the plea-

ures of animal life, and in the intellectual powers of man. The air earth and sea are full of animated happy beings.

77. Q. Does natural Theology teach that God should be obeyed and worshipped? A. Yes. our obligation to obedience rests on the omnipotence & infinitude & excellence of God, and his relation to us as creator and preserver.

78. Q. Do all men agree in this truth? A. Mankind in general do, as appears from every nation having some form of religious worship. Though there are doubtless individuals who question the propriety of praising God, or the efficacy of addressing him in prayer.

79. Q. Does it inform us how we should worship him? It is a dictate of natural religion to pray, but the method of approaching God by a mediator is a subject entirely of revelation.

80. Q. Can we learn the Justice Holiness and
truth of God from a survey of his works?

A. These attributes properly speaking can
not be said to be capable of demonstra-
tion from the works of God. We are led to
ascribe justice to God from the dictates of
conscience, and the sentiments of jus-
tice in our own breasts. The same maybe
said of the other two, they are included in
the idea of an ens summe perfectum.

81. Q. Does it teach that the wicked will be
punished? A. Yes, reason teaches that it shall
be well with the righteous, and ill with the
wicked. That the doctrine of future punish-
ment is a part of natural religion, ap-
pear, from its being prevalent in all na-
tions and ages, its truth is strongly con-
firmed by the natural dread excited
by conscience in the breasts of the wicked
and by the analogy of the present state,
since God has ~~so~~ ordered, that our happiness
or misery even here shall depend in a

great measure on our own conduct.

Q. How does it appear that God exercises a moral government over the world? A. The 1st argument in proof of God's moral government is, — That since in fact God does govern the world by the distribution of rewards and punishments, according to some settled rule it is most natural, That this rule should be the moral merit or demerit of men.

II^d That peace and external advantage are the natural consequences of prudence in regard to ourselves & our affairs, and inconvenience and suffering the result of negligence and rashness. III^d From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society, & there is a necessity for it's being so.

IVth In the natural course of things, virtue as such is actually rewarded, and vice as such punished. Virtue, as such, is rewarded, by the satisfaction attending it, by the hope of future happiness, by ^{the} approbation,

all good men. &c. V. th. The tendencies of virtue and vice, are necessarily to produce respective good and bad effects, both in individuals and in societies. Thus power under the direction of virtue is more efficacious than if directed by vice.

83. Q. By what arguments is the immortality of the soul proved? A. Ist by its immateriality, II it is not probable that God shld make all his creatures temporary. III. The capacity of the soul to increase in knowledge is unlimited. IV. The desire of immortality being deeply implanted in our souls. V the unequal distribution of good and evil in this world. VI. prevalent in every age and nation.

84 Q. What degree of conviction do these arguments produce? A. They only render the truth of the doctrine probable, it is the gospel that brings life and immortality from this state of dimness & obscurity, in to light.

85 Q. Is the knowledge of the truths of Nat relig
ion sufficient to salvation? A. no. since Christ
is only known by the Gospel & because the state
of the gentiles is called the times of ignorance
Acts 17. 30. 3 were salvation by a common re
ligion no necessity of revelation. but the
world by wisdom knew not God.

86 Q. In what respects is natural Theology de
fective? A. It cannot teach us the true cha
racter of God, — the method of reconciliation
to him by an atonement — The nature &
extent of our duties to the Supreme Being
— our destiny in a future state. And it is
defective in certainly authority & motives.

87 Q. Is the necessity of revelation evinced by
a view of the truths of Nat Theology? Yes
Reason teaches man only, sufficient to
render him sensible of the necessity of be
ing taught of God.

88. Q How is the necessity of revelation evinced
by a view of the history of the world? A. By
observing 1st that in exact proportion as men

increased in human wisdom, have they become ignorant of God. 2^d That the most erroneous & shocking ideas were prevalent respecting his nature & worship. 3^d That the state of morals arising from these errors, was exceedingly corrupt.

89. Q. Was not revelation necessary to give a greater certainty to the truths of Nat. Religion? A. Yes. as the greatest men, have only been doubtful of some of the most important branches of true religion, such as the immortality of the soul. &c. and as the sophistry of man's deceitful heart would lead him to question the plainest principles of Nat. Theology.

90. Q. Was it not necessary to give authority and sanction to these truths? It was.

91. Q. Was not revelation necessary to inform us whether God was reconcilable to sinners, and on what terms? The delay of punishment might excite in the sinner some hope that God would shew mercy, but rea-

son could never ~~could~~ discover that a just God
could pass by transgression. And we see all
men erring in regard to the terms on which
they expect forgiveness, trusting to works of
righteousness, not to grace through faith.

Revealed Theology.

2 Q. What is revealed Theology? A. The system
of doctrine contained in the word of God.

3 Q. How can it be proved that a revelation
has been made? A. It is evident that a revela-
tion is practicable, and we have seen that
from the nature and situation of man, it
is both probable & necessary. And that it
has been made, is certain, from the inter-
nal & external evidences accompanying
~~certain~~ certain communications professing
to be from God.

4 Q. By what means was a revelation made?
A. By immediate converse with God - by
the ministry of Angels - by vision & Thum
mim, by voices visions inspiration - and
in these last times God hath spoken un

to us by his Son.

95. Q. Why was it necessary that it should be committed to writing? A. First it was necessary to preserve it as a constant rule of faith and practice. 2^{dly} to windicate it from fraud & corruption. 3^{dly} to propagate it to posterity and to those afar off.

96. Q. Is every thing which God has revealed to man contained in The S.P.? No, altho they comprind^{he} all that is necessary to salvation as is proved. i. Because a curse is pronounced against those who should add or detract from the word. ii Because the end of the scriptures requires their perfection. iii. Because traditions are forbid; "teaching for doctrines, the commandments of men" iv. Because no reason can be given, why God shld wish one part of his word to be written, and an other part delivered viva voce.

97. Q. How can it be proved that the S.P. contain a divine revelation? A. First from the internal evidence thus popey. which ^{is} ~~can~~

~~sist~~ I That from them may be extracted
a system of ~~a~~ religion entirely new, both with
regard to object & doctrines, not only infinite
ly superior to, but unlike again everything
which had before entered into the mind of
man. II That from them also may be col-
lected a more extensive correct & pure sys-
tem of morals, than is to be found in all
the works of the wisest men of preceding
ages. III. That such a system of religion and
morality could not possibly have been the
work of any man or set of men, much
less of the obscure & illiterate persons who
actually did discover & publish it to the
world. ∴ it must be from God.

Secondly, from the external evidences of
Miracles and Prophecy.

98. How can the authority of the T.P. be establish-
ed? It rests on the credibility of the Apostles
and prophets as witnesses of facts, and de-
liverers of doctrines. and since them it is
supported by the strongest historical evidence.

99. What is the difference between genuineness and authenticity? A book is genuine when it is the production of the man whose name it bears. authentic when what it communicates is correct.

100. What is a miracle? It means in the original import of the word, a wonder. more definitely, it is an effect contrary to the established constitution or course of things or a sensible deviation from the known laws of nature.

101. Q Are miracles of different kinds? Yes, ~~as~~^{1st} such as none but God himself can perform, implying omnipotence. 2 such as require supernatural agency, but may be supposed to be within the powers of good or evil spirits.

102 Q. How do miracles prove a divine revelation? They are the testimonies of God, in favour of the truth, ~~then~~^{are} wrought to maintain. Neither can their authority be diminished by observing that, even demons

have performed miracles. For this objection bears only against the second kind of miracles mentioned above, & these are always attended by circumstances which determine their origin.

13 Q Is any testimony sufficient to prove a miracle? Yes. it is plain that it is possible that a miracle may be wrought under circumstances which render deception impossible.

14 Q. What was Hume's argument against miracles & how answered? He maintained it to be contrary to experience that a miracle should be true, but not contrary to experience that testimony should be false. Therefore the argument against miracles he thought to be stronger than any drawn from testimony could be in their favour. His argument is founded on the principle, that experience is the ground of our confidence in testimony which is just the reverse of the truth, since the

most experienced are generally the most incredulous. This doctrine of Hume is fully computed by Dr Campbell, by Dr Hume by Professor Vince. &c

105. What are the miracles of the S^d different from those related in other books?

A. Other miracles are defective in the number circumstances, or character of those who bear testimony for them, or the miracles themselves, are such as may be accounted for by supposing them to be merely false perceptions. or they are only tentative miracles, or exaggerated stories. &c &c. See Paley's Evidences.

106 Q. Can the success of the Gospel be accounted for without miracles? No the success of such a system as the Gospel, in spite of the most uniform & powerful opposition, and by the weakest instruments would, except on the supposition of miracles, be a greater miracle than any contained in the S. S.

107 Q Could the witnesses of Christ's miracles have been deceived? A. No.

108 Q. Was it possible for them to have obtained credit, if what they said had been false?
A. - No. For those to whom they preached were addressed as witnesses, of the truth of the facts they asserted.

109 Q Can any reason be assigned for their attempting to establish an imposture?
None. for men do not chuse evil for its own sake. And from the nature of the religion which they propagated the worldly prosperity of its first teachers was incompatible with success. As they knew themselves to be impostors, they could be actuated by no hope of future reward, and hence failure & success were alike to be attended with misery to them.

110 Q Is a man's suffering for his opinions any prove of their truth? A. none. men have died on different sides of the same question. error can boast almost as many

martyrs as truth.

111. Q Is it an evidence of his sincerely believing them? A Yes. "all that a man hath will he give for his life."

112 Q If Christianity had been an imposture could its propagators have avoided betraying themselves? They could not. The history they record is so long & circumstantial, & the system of doctrine so complex that their perfect harmony appears not only to require the truth of what they communicate, but ^{also} a superintending care of providence.

113 Q If miracles are important to prove a revelation why have they ceased? A. Because their frequency would destroy their authority, since it would then be difficult to distinguish the interruptions from the regular course of nature. Besides there may be reasons with which we are not acquainted why it is best that should not now be wrought. See Ap. p. 7

114 Q. Is the evidence of miracles as strong now as at first? It is at present ~~our~~ belief in miracles rests on the testimony, at first it rested on the witness of the senses.

115 Q. If miracles should now be wrought in favour of doctrines opposite to the Bible what would be the consequence? A. It is impossible that miracles of the first class should be wrought in opposition to the Bible, since God cannot deny himself; and the tendency of miracles of the second kind, ~~from~~ being bad proves their origin to be evil, and thus destroys their authority.

116 Q. How does Prophecy prove a divine revelation? A. Because it argues a ~~nothing~~ knowledge of futurity, which can only be derived from God.

117 Q. Are prophecies always obscure? A. Generally before their accomplishment.

118 Q. Why is prophecy so often involved in obscure & symbolical language? A. First because they were not intended so much for those

to whom they were at first delivered, as for ages
then future. 2nd were they more obvious it
would be objected, that the event was made
to correspond to the prediction, by those
interested in the accomplishment.

117. Q. Does the obscurity of some prophecies weak-
en the evidence of those which are plain?
No, our not understanding all, does ^{not} prove we
can understand none.

120. Q. What particular prophecies have
been remarkably fulfilled? of the Deluge.
of the number of Abrahams posterity. of the
superiority of Jacob over Esau. of the destruc-
tion of Nineveh, Babylon, Jericho, Jeru-
salem. of the Messiah. the time of his com-
ing as mention in Daniel, his character,
Isaiah. LIII. of Isaiah. &c &c

120 Q. Can it be proved that these prophe-
cies were written before the events oc-
curred to which they refer? A. Yes. They
are found in the most ancient Book in
the world, preserved by those who are un

friendly to the cause many of them are produced to support.

Q. Are any prophecies fulfilling now?

A. Continued dispersion of the Jews, independence of the Arabs, progress of the Gospel.

22. Q. Does the evidence of prophecy become stronger or weaker by the lapse of time?

A. Stronger.

23. Q. Have there been any true prophecies besides those contained in the Bible? It is very probable that many predictions, uttered by men divinely inspired, were never recorded in the Bible; but as the knowledge of futurity belongs only to God, there never could have been a true prophecy, not derived directly or indirectly from him.

24. Q. What judgement should we form of the Heathen oracles and the books of the Soothsayers?

A. 1st The testimony respecting man is unsatisfactory. 2^d The responses were often so contrived as to suit the event should it happen either way. 3^d They failed much more fre-

quently, than they proved correct. & thThe truth of the event may often be accounted for, by the skillfulness of the prophet or prophetess in ~~fr~~ conjecturing, or by the assistance of demons whose wonderful sagacity and great experience might enable them to conjecture what was future with considerable certainty.

The Books of the Sybels were much a collection of Jewish Christian & Heathen sayings turned into wretched verse. This collection was made by some indiscreet christian about the time of Antonius Pius. This is what is now extant. But besides these ~~there~~ ^{were} ancient oracles of the Sybels mentioned by Plato Aristotle Varro Livy &c. who or how many the ~~Sybel's~~ ^{Sybel's} were, is not known. Character of the authors must have ^{been} bad as they often direct ^{ed} to wicked & superstitious services. Hence if they were inspired it must have been by Demons. The story of the three books sold to Tarquin a mere fraud. Those

laid up in the Capitol were subject only to the inspection of the sacred college. When these were burned with the Capitol in the time of Sylla, and search being made in order to restore them, abundance of prophecies under the name of the Sibyls were produced so that about 80 years B.C. the world was filled with them. Augustus is said to have burned 2000 volumes of them. These contained many prophecies relative to the Messiah derived probably from the Jews scattered among the nations.

25 Q. What is the internal evidence of the truth of the S.S.? Those proofs which are founded on the nature of their doctrines, and the character of the dispensation itself

26 Q. How do the matter scope & style of the S.S. prove their divinity? The matter or contents testifies its divine origin, by the sublimity of its mysteries, & purity of its precepts & ~~their~~ extending even to the thoughts. Their scope in tending to glorify God, sanctify and

save man. Their style, by its majestic simplicity and gravitas.

127 Q. Is there any evidence to be derived from Jewish and heathen authors? A. Yes Tacitus, Suetonius, the younger Pliny, Juvenal all speak of the christians, & Tacitus especially gives a succinct account of their origin. There is in Josephus several allusions to the christian history, the genuineness of the most important of these however is disputed. — With respect to the O. Testament, many of the facts therein recorded, are to be found preserved in obscure allusions in the works of early heathen writers, such as, the state of innocence, the fall, the deluge &c &c see Butler P. 64.

128 Q. Are there any contradictions in the S.P.? There is a most wonderful harmony in all the sacred writers, such as considering their circumstances as admits of no other explanation than, ^a divine superintendence. Those inconsistencies which do exist, may

in general be accounted for, by recurring to. The similitude of things done at different times, The ambiguity of names - one person or place having several names &c. It must however be admitted that there ^{are} some discrepancies particularly in chronology only to be reconciled, on the supposition of the corruption of the text.

29. Q. Are there any doctrines contrary to reason? none. Though there are many incomprehensible.

30. Q. Does the chronology geography & history of S. S. coincide with what other writers teach on this subject? A. In general they do, were there is a disagreement the S. S. apart from their inspiration are the best entitled to credit.

31. Q. Do the sentiments customs & manners mentioned or alluded to in the S. S. agree with what is known of eastern nations? very exactly, even as they are at the present day. for in the east national cha-

acters and manners have changed
much less than in the West.

Inspiration.

132. Q. What is Inspiration. and into how many kinds is it divided? Any supernatural influence on the mind of man which enables him to discover truth, or to understand it, which by the exertion of his natural powers he would not have discovered, or understood so clearly, may be called inspiration. As to its object therefore it may be considered I. As leading to the knowledge of truth before unknown II. As affording clearer knowledge of truth before known 3. As giving assurance to the mind of the truth, of such things as we have observed ourselves, or heard from others; but with respect to which, when left to ourselves we are liable to fall into mistakes. It has been distinguished into that of immediate suggestion. 2 general superintendence 3. elevation.

Q. What is meant by Inspiration of immediate suggestion? A. That by which the spirit of God reveals particular truths to the mind immediately, and this Revelation may be of words as well as of things, or the truth may be revealed & it may be left to the person inspired to clothe it in his own language.

Q. What is meant by Superintendency and elevation? Superintendency is that, by which the spirit influences the inspired person, to write or speak such things, as he may know by the common means of acquiring information, but which preserves him from the errors incident to human imperfection, Elevation exists where no new truths, are revealed, and when no particular superintendency is required, and consists in strengthening and elevating all the powers of the mind for some special purpose so that the production shall far exceed

The natural abilities of the person.
Such inspiration we may suppose ex-
isted in those who composed divine
songs, & also when persons were called
to make their defence before Kings &
Governors. But in the latter case it would
appear that the very words as well as
the ideas were suggested to them by the
Holy Ghost. And in the composition
of Divine poems and psalms, some-
thing more was necessary to preserve
from error than mere elevation of
mind. It is doubtful therefore whether
this ought to be considered as distinct
species. for we have reason to believe
that even preachers and writers may
have their minds elevated by a divine
influence; but we cannot say that
they are inspired. for that which dis-
tinguishes inspiration from the illu-
mination of which all christians par-
take is, that by the former something

unknown is revealed, whilst by the latter the mind is furnished with a spiritual discernment of truths which were well understood before.

135 Q. Is this distinction correct? Not altogether.

136 Q. What kind and degree of Inspiration is to be ascribed to the sacred writers? A. The plenary inspiration of the S. P. should be maintained. 2 Though the inspiration was plenary, yet there is no necessity of supposing any greater influence on the mind of the person inspired than what was sufficient to accomplish the effect objected in view. 3 The proper method therefore of ascertaining the kinds & degrees of inspiration will be to consider the difference of the matter contained in the Holy S. 4. Many things in scripture must be considered a direct Revelation from God, both as to the ideas & words. such as laws & positive institutions. Prophecies whether literal or symbolical, and to this class belong

also the discourses & sayings of our Lord
Jesus Christ, who was the great medium
of communication between God & man
5 But many things contained in scrip-
ture are of such a nature, that they
could be known, and some of them
must be known by those who record-
ed them, without any revelation. The
question then is what need was there of
inspiration to write such things? An-
swer it was necessary 1 To guide the
persons in the selection of facts, and
circumstances. 2 To preserve them from
such slips of memory, as all men are
liable to; and to revive in their memo-
ry such discourses as could not be ex-
actly retained so long a time. 3 To af-
firm them of facts they may have re-
ceived only on probable evidence. 6 It
is not necessary to suppose that in
writing such parts of scripture, the very
words were suggested to them, as the truth

of the facts & not the beauty or sublimity of the language was the object in view and the great variety of style in the S. P. evinces that the writers were in a good degree left to choose their own language. But as the precision & perspicuity with which truth is communicated, depends greatly on the language by which it is conveyed, in order to a clear revelation of the will of God, it was necessary that fallible & especially unlearned men should be under a particular guidance in the selection of their words, so as to preserve them from ambiguous & improper terms. The rule therefore seems to be this - that as far as was necessary for the certainty & perspicuity in the thing revealed, there was a superintending influence in guiding to the selection of proper words. Many compositions contained in scripture are of a devotional and moral kind

such as Psalms and prayers. Those which
they then proceed from pious men are to
be considered as inspired. Though we are
not to consider every declaration or discourse in
the S.S. as inspired as those of Job's friends
the speeches of wicked men. 8. The last
class of scripture truths are such as con-
tain reasonings & discussions on parti-
cular points; such as the Epistles of the
apostles. Here we think that the writ-
ers were under a divine guidance, so as
to be preserved from error; but in the
choice of words, and in the peculiar
style of writing, and method of reason-
ing were left very much to their own nat-
ural genius. So far however as divine
assistance was requisite to make the rea-
soning correct, and to guide them to pro-
per words by which to express their ideas
so far was it afforded to the inspired
writers.

136. Where the words as well as the ideas re-

vealed? See the answer to the preceding question.

37 Q. In how many different ways were revelations made? 1. Many truths recorded in scripture were spoken by God himself, or by Jesus Christ the son of God, Thus immediate intercourse existed between God and the first man. 2 Truths not capable of being known by reason were revealed to chosen men by immediate suggestion to the mind, as the gospel to Paul. 3 Revelations were frequently made by visions, in which by some symbolical representations, the persons were instructed in the truths intended to be made known. 4. Revelations were made by dreams of this we have numerous examples 5 They were made by the mission of angels 6 by Uim and Thummim - and voices or as the Jews says ברוך ה'.

Attributes.

138. Q. Are the divine attributes the same with the divine essence? They are, for were they not, God would be neither supreme, simple nor perfect, since he would be made up of different attributes really distinct. Neither could he be immutable were his attributes distinguishable from his essence.

139. Q. How are they usually distinguished? A. Theologians have adopted various modes of distribution. The most common are those into communicable & incommunicable natural & moral.

140. Q. What attributes are termed communicable? Knowledge Wisdom Power Holiness Justice Goodness Truth.

141. Q. What are the incommunicable? Self-existence Independence Simplicity Infinity Eternity Immutability Unity.

142. Q. Is there any objection to this distribution of the Divine Attributes? A. It has

been objected that of those attributes called incommunicable, some faint resemblance is to be found in creatures. Thus finite duration ^{is} some image of infinite duration as much as finite power is of omnipotence.

143 How are they otherwise divided? Natural and moral, absolute & relative.

144 What ^{are} the natural perfections of God? Unity, Selfexistence, Spirituality, Omnipotence, Immutability, Spirituality, Trinity, Wisdom, Knowledge.

145 Which are the moral perfections of God?
A. Justice, Holiness, Goodness, Truth.

146 Are there any other Theological divisions of the Divine Attributes? Negative & Positive.

147 What perfections arise out of the necessary existence of God? A. All his natural perfections and some of his moral as Dr S Clarke supposes.

148 What perfections are dependent, on the divine will, & what on his understanding?
A. His moral attributes depend on his Will.

as morality is seated in the will. His knowledge and wisdom appear to be connected more immediately with his Understanding.

149 What names are given to God in the LXX? Jehovah Aleim, Adonai Jah. Sheddai, Me.

150. What is the import of these names? A.

יהוה signifies selfexistence eternity from יהוה. אלה imports strength from אל. אלה a cultus. ידוי all sufficient if from ידוי to pour forth all mighty if from ידוי vastant. אהי "I am" imports independence immutability eternity &c.

יה from יהיה to exists denotes the essence. ו.ו. -

עליון most high from עלה to ascend. - אדני

Lord supporter. The Greek names κυριος &

θεος are also significant. The first denotes selfexistence a κειν to exist, also authority. The second, maker persuader. a θεω to place.

151. Is there any distinction between the selfexistence & independence of God? No. The latter is implied in the former, what exists of itself, can depend on no other.

Q. 152. How can it be demonstrated that God

the force of existence.

is self-existent and independent? A. These imply that God cannot but be, and be what ^{he} is, and that altogether in and of himself. They are proved 1. From express passages of scripture. I am that I am Exodus III. 4 I am Alpha & Omega the beginning and the ending. Rev. I. 8. 2. As God is the cause of all things, and the upholder of them all ~~it~~ ^{it} would imply a contradiction to say he was dependent on any thing. 3. If God is infinitely above the highest creatures he can depend on none.

153 How may the Unity of God be demonstrated? A. It may be proved from his self-existence, infinity. The Unity of God means that there neither ^{is} nor can be more than one individual divine substance. It is plainly declared in the word. Deut. 6. 4 Hear Oh Israel the Lord our God is one God. Exodus 20. 3 Thou shalt have no other Gods before me. James II. 19 Thou believest that there is one God, Thou believest well. The Unity

of God is inferred from his necessary existence and infinity. From the unity of design observable in the world and from the supposition of more Gods than one being unnecessary.

154. How is the Spirituality of God evinced? A. The Spirituality of God is his immateriality. And comprises a negative & positive idea. The first consists in removing from our idea of God the known properties of matter. The second in referring to him the powers of perception, thought will and action. That God is immaterial appears from 1. his self existence. 2 his being everywhere 3 from his omnipresence 4 from his invisibility. 5 from the express language of scripture. "God is a Spirit" John. 4. 24.

155 What is meant by the spiritual simplicity of God and how proved to be a divine perfection? The simplicity of God is that divine attribute by which God is

not only free from all composition or division, but utterly incapable of either. It is proved 1st from the divine independence 2. from his unity. 3 from his absolute perfection.

156. Is God necessarily invisible? Yes. Spirit is invisible.

157. Is activity essential God? Yes. an inactive spirit is a contradiction.

158. What is meant by the life of God? A. The most perfect kind of existence, comprehending both being and blissedness. By which he not only is, and is happy but also is the source of existence and happiness. God is life essentially "The Father hath life in himself" Joh. 5. 26. and eternally.

159. Is there any distinction between the immensity and omnipresence of God? A. The omnipresence of God arises from his immensity. The latter as an absolute attribute belonging to God from eternity.

6. The former ^{refers} relates to his relation to place & existing in time.

160. How does it appear that God is omnipresent? A. From the plain declarations of scripture. see Psalm. 139. "Do not fill heaven and earth saith the Lord" Jer. 23. 24.

2. It is necessary that the preserver of all things should be present with all things.

3. It is necessary to his perfection.

161. Is he every ^{where} present with his essence or only with his power & knowledge? Effects being produced every where proves that God is essentially every where. Besides his power and knowledge belong to his essence.

162. Is he equally present every where? A.

Yes. Though not in the same manner his glorious presence is particularly in heaven. his gracious presence with the good. &c.

163. Is he present in empty space beyond the limits of creation? Yes. For he might

create other worlds beyond the bounds of those already made, and he would be essentially present in them as well as in ours. Whatever pertains to God is infinite, but were his essence contained within any limits, it would be finite. Solomon says "Behold the Heaven & Heavens cannot contain thee".

164. Is space a divine attribute? or is it a creature? or a quality? or nothing? A. Space is nothing more than a certain relation of being, and cannot be conceived of, but as a relation. We derive the idea from extended substances.

165. How may it be demonstrated that God is eternal? A. The eternity of God implies his existence without beginning, end, or succession of duration. That he is without beginning is inferred from his self existence, 2^d from express passages of scripture "I was set up from everlasting from the beginning, or ever the earth was." Prov 8. 23

That he is without end. is infered from his spirituality, simplicity & immutability. "From everlasting to everlasting thou art God."

166. Does The eterniti of God impls exclude all succession of duration? *Ans.* No, Because. 1. he is said to be before succession "Before the day was I am" *Isaiah 43. 13* 2 were his duration successive, then there must have been some first day or year which is inconsistent with the idea of eternity. Besides a day would then be but a day to him, and not "as a thousand years." 3 succession is inconsistent with immutability and perfection. 4 his knowledge proves him without successive duration. For he sees the present without a medium, the past without recollection & the future without foresight. To him all truths are but one idea, all places but one point, and all times but one moment."

167 Have we any idea of duration without succession? No. our idea of duration is derived from the succession of our ideas.

168. Do not the S. S. speak of past, present & future with respect to God? Yes. In accommodation to the mode in which we are capable only of conceiving of the works of God. And in respect to the effects produced in times.

169. Is time a portion of eternity or something entirely distinct? They are entirely distinct being species of duration directly opposed. Eternity always was & will be, it is one unchangeable, unmoving presence. Time began & continues by succession & is to terminate.

170. Is immutability a divine perfection?

A. Immutability is ^{that} perfection by which all possibility of change is denied, in the Deity. Mat. III. 6 I am the Lord, I change not. Heb 13. 8. Jesus Christ the same yesterday to day and forever. The immutability of God belongs to every thing pertaining to the divine nature. To suppose him capable of change is inconsistent, with his supreme perfection, with his simplicity, and with his eternity. Indeed true eternity is true immutability. Though they differ in our conceptions. Immutability is the state itself. eternity the measure of that state.

171. Is the will of God immutable as well as his essence? Yes 1.st Because the will of God is the same with his essence. it is Deus volens. 2 Because his purposes are eternal. 3 Because there ^{can} be no cause for a change in the divine will. He may will a change without changing his will. Psalm 33. 11.

"The counsel of the Lord standeth forever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations."

172. Is immutability of will reconcilable with liberty? Yes. For the liberty of God's will does not consist so much in indifference, as in independence on all things without himself. What God is he chooses to be, though ^{he} is what ^{he} is immutably. And to be immutably good, is no weakness but the height of perfection.

173. How can the repentance of God be reconciled with immutability? A. This language is used in accommodation to the weakness of our capacity. In the same manner as the several members of the body are in scripture referred to God. When therefore God is said to repent it is nothing more than there is such a change in his ~~own~~ conduct, as in man proceeds from a change of mind, or repentance; though this change in God's dispensation, was the object of an eter-

nal immutable decree.

174. How can the non-fulfillment of threatnings be reconciled with immutability? A. All these threatnings are conditional, tho' the condition may not have ^{been} expressed. And they are intended more to declare what will be the result of natural causes, or the inseparable connection between demerit & punishment, than what God intends to accomplish in every particular case.

175. How is the knowledge of God distinguished? A. It may be variously considered 1st as to its mode & object. 2. Speculative & practical. 3 As the knowledge of a simple intelligence & of vision.

176. What is the knowledge of simple intelligence? A. The knowledge of all possible things. of all that may be, though it never shall be.

177. What is the knowledge of vision? The knowledge of all things future. It follows the act of the divine will decreeing, which it

presupposes.

178. Is there any Scientia Media? This signifies a middle species of knowledge between the two just mentioned, differing from the knowledge of intelligence (or natural knowledge) because it relates to future things, and from that of vision, because it refers to things only hypothetically future. Turretin's arguments against a Scientia Media are 1st That the other two kinds of knowledge embrace every ^{thing} that is capable of being known. 2 because things cannot be foreseen as true, which are not true. 3 because all the acts of a created will are subject to the divine providence. 4. No uncertain knowledge is to be attributed to God. 5 Scientia Media destroys God's dominion over the free acts of the will. 6 If there were a Scientia Media, some other cause might be assigned for predestination than the mere beneficentium of God.

179. When By whom and for what purpose was it invented? By The Jesuits to support the semi-pelagian doctrine respect^{ing} the fore-knowledge of faith as the cause of election. And to maintain the freedom of the will.

180. Does the knowledge of God extend infallibly to contingencies? Any thing is said to be contingent in the language of Theology, which in the nature of things might have been otherwise than it is. It refers not to the event which is certain, but to the mode of production. That God knows things contingent is proved 1st from ^{being said} ~~its being said~~ in the Bible. "Hell & destruction are before the Lord how much more the hearts of the children of men" 2. from his predicting them. 3 from the perfection of his nature. 4 from his decreeing them.

181. Is the knowledge of God noetical or dianoetical? Noetical. he perceives every thing by intuition. —

182 What is the object of the divine ^{will}? A. Good.

183 Does God will any thing necessarily? A. Necessity is twofold 1st absolute. by wh. a thing from its nature cannot be other wise than it is. 2^d hypothetical i.e. some- thing else being granted. The other fol- lows of necessity. as salvation from elec- tion. Now ^{God} wills himself absolutely ne- cessarily. because he is the chief good and therefore he cannot but will & love himself.

184. Does God will any thing freely? A. Liberty also is twofold 1 that of spon- taneity which is opposed to coercion 2 that of indifference. In the first sense what God wills most necessarily, he wills freely. But in the second also he wills all created things freely. for all crea- ted things are with respect to God con- tingent. i.e. he might will or not will them.

185. Is the will of God properly divided in

to Secret and Revealed? Yes. The first refers to the will that lies hid in God, the last to that made known in the Law and Gospel. The first has for its object all things God has determined to effect or permit. The second all that relates to our duty.

186. What other terms are used to express this distinction. decretive and preceptive. *εὐδοκίας, et εὐαισθησίας* These derived from scripture the first Matt. 11.26. The second Rom. 12. 2 Eph. 5.10., also. *beneficentiae et signi.*

187. Is there no contrariety in these two wills? No. The decretive will determines the event, the preceptive prescribes the duty; They do not contradict each other because they have different objects. And though God may will that an event should take place contrary to his precept yet he forces no one to act against his commandment.

188. Is the will of God properly distinguish

ed into antecedent & consequent? A. No.
But the first is understood that, by which
God wills something to a rational creature
prior to any act of the creature, The se-
cond is that, by which he wills something
after some act or many acts of the creature.
Thus they say he has an antecedent will
to save all men, and a consequent will
to save only those who believe. Christ had
an antecedent will to gather together the
children of Israel and a consequent will
to scatter them abroad. But this is dis-
honourable to God as it ascribes contrary
wills to him, makes him mutable, his
will inefficacious, and subjects him to
the conduct of man.

184. Into efficacious and inefficacious, ab-
solute and conditional? An. If these terms
refer respectively to the decretive and pre-
ceptive will of God, they may be correct
but if they are referred only to the decre-
tive will they are not.

191. Can any cause be assigned for the divine will? can any reason? The will of God is the first cause, the cause of all things & consequently can have no cause prior to it. But as God does every thing most wisely he must have reasons for his volitions though they be hid from us.

191. Is the will of God the primary rule of right & wrong? It is as it regards man because God is perfectly good, but not as it respects God himself, for God wills many things because they are good in themselves. Were the will of God the only rule of right & wrong, he might make Atheism, Envy, Pride & virtues.

192. How does it appear that Justice is a divine attribute? Justice is that attribute which disposes God to render to himself and all his creatures that which is equal & right. Psalm. 11. 7 The righteous Lord loveth righteousness. His justice appears in his giving righteous laws to all

his creatures, in the sanctions of these laws &c.

193 Q. What is general justice? It is that by which God, does what is right in all his works.

194 What is vindictive justice? That by which God punishes sin as sin.

195 How can it be demonstrated that this last is an essential attribute of God? A. 1. From the voice of scripture. 2 from the dictates of conscience & the consent of all people. 3 from the sanction of the law and all the levitical ceremonies. & from our redemption by the death of Christ.

196 How may it be proved that God is good? A. Because it is essential to perfection. 2 He that is the cause of all created good must be the supreme good. 3 His word declares him good. Psalm. 25.3 "Good & upright is the Lord." 4 Proved from the works of Creation Providence and Redemption.

197. How is goodness defined? It is that attribute by which God is beneficial to his creatures.

198. What is the love of God, and how distinguished? The Love of God, is his natural delight in that which is good. It is distinguished in the love of benevolence, beneficence, and of complacency.

199. What is love of benevolence, what of beneficence, what of complacency?

A. The first is that by which God from eternity wished well to his creatures, the second that by which he does them good in time, The last is that by which he delights in them on account of some rays of his own image he finds upon them.

200. By what considerations is the Love of God recommended to us? An. By the majesty of him who loves, by the vanity and unworthiness of its recipients, by the dignity of him in

whom we are loved, and by the multitude and richness of the blessings which flow from it.

201. What is the grace of God? God's free favour and Love. It is distinguished into common and special.

202. How are the mercy and the grace of God distinguished? Mercy is the divine benignity exercised towards the miserable, Grace is the same benignity exercised towards the unworthy.

203. Wherein does the greatness of the divine mercy appear? From the character of him who exhibits it, who is perfectly blessed and independent. 2 from the character of its objects, who are enemies miserable and sinful. 3 from its effects, redemption from sin and hell, and the conferring eternal life. 4 from its duration which is eternal.

204. How is the truth of God evinced? It is that essential attribute by which God is infinitely removed from all falsehood and

deceit. It is evinced by the sense of the excellence of truth found in the minds of his creatures, by the fulfillment of predictions &c. &c.

205. Can it be proved from the S. P.? An Rom. 3. 4 Yea. Let God be true and every man a liar. Psal. 31. 5. Into thy hands I commit my spirit. Thou hast redeemed me O Lord God of truth. Psal. 100. 5 For the Lord is good, his mercy is everlasting, and his truth endureth to all generations.

206 What is the distinction between the truth and faithfulness of God? The truth of God consists in the exact agreement of his words and works with his thoughts inclination, and will. His faithfulness consists in the exact correspondence of his works with his declarations, predictions and all the relations in which he stands to his creatures.

207. Does the word Holiness mean any

distinct attribute or the aggregate of all.

An. Some Divines consider it as a distinct attribute others as the aggregate of all.

208. Can the Holiness of God be defined or analysed? Charnock defines ^{it} to be negatively "a perfect and unpolluted freedom from all evil" positively as the "Rectitude or integrity of the divine nature."

209. Is Omnipotence an attribute of God?

An. Yes. Though the power and will of God do not differ essentially, but the first is more extensive than the latter.

It is divided in ordinate and absolute the latter is that by which he is able to do, what he will not do, yet which may be done. The first is that by which he doth that which he hath decreed to do. It is ascribed to him in the S.P.

Mat. 19. 26 "with God all things are possible" 2 proved from power in his creatures. 3 from the works of creation Providence and Redemption.

210 Can God do any thing? A. Yes, any thing not repugnant to his nature, nor involving a contradiction.

211. How are impossible things distinguished? Into supernatural, natural and moral.

212 What is a supernatural impossibility? Such as implies a contradiction & which divine power cannot effect, such as to make a sensitive stone.

213 What is a natural impossibility? A. That which cannot be effected by the power of second causes. as creation.

214. What is a moral impossibility? A. That which cannot be done consistent ly with the laws of holiness.

215. Is it any derogation from omnipotence not to be able to do impossibilities? No. They are not the objects of power.

216. Could God create an infinite Being? no. two infinite Beings imply a ^{contradiction} contradiction.

217. Could God deny himself or act in consistantly with his perfections? An. Tim. 2. 13. "If we believe not, yet he abideth faithful: he cannot deny himself."

218. What is the Dominion of God? Is his absolute right to, and authority over all his creatures to do with them as he pleased.

219. On what is his dominion founded? An. The foundation of God's dominion is two fold. 1.st The supreme excellency of his nature. 2. The number & richness of his benefits as creator and preserver.

220 Is the dominion of God absolute and unlimited? Yes. As he is perfectly independent, so he is subject to no law but does with own what he wills. and no one can say unto him What doest thou?

221. Have we any adequate ideas of God? A. None. we know only in part. God is infinite of course by every finite being incomprehensible. Canst thou by searching find out God?

222. How does it appear that God is infinite
ly perfect? It is a dictate of common se
nse, and should always be considered
as a first principle in Theology. The
scriptures represent all his attributes
as infinite.

223. Do the works of God prove him
infinite in all his perfections? His
works / unless it be the act of creating /
are all finite, and therefore cannot
strictly be said to prove their author
infinite.

224. Do all men agree in ascribing in
finite perfection to God? They do, as
far as their ideas of perfection extend.

225. Is God infinitely happy? Yes. For
his independence, and omnipotence
place him beyond the reach of all
external evil, and his infinite per
fection and holiness forbid the sup
position of any cause of pain within
himself. But if happy at all he ^{be} must.

infinitely so.

26. Is it right to ascribe to God everything we know to be a perfection? We can't avoid it.

Trinity.

27. Does the light of nature teach us any thing of the mode of the divine existence? It does not, because the works of nature, are not capable of being the medium of such a communication.

28. Is the doctrine of a Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence inconsistent with reason? An. It is not contrary to reason, though beyond its reach. A doctrine is properly said to be contrary to reason when it contradicts some first principle of reason or some conclusion derived by demonstration from first principles. But the doctrine of the Trinity does not contradict any such principle or con

clusion, because we do not say that
these Persons in the Godhead are one
person, or that one divine Being is
these divine Beings. The argument
drawn from reason against this article
of our faith rests on this principle,
that because among angels and men
every distinct person is also a distinct
Being, ^{therefore if} there ~~are~~ we say there ~~are~~ three dis-
tinct persons in the Godhead, we must
admit there are three distinct Beings
in the Deity, which is Trithicism, But
this is evidently arguing from finite
to infinite, which must from its na-
ture be an inconclusive argument.

229 Has the doctrine of a Trinity in De-
ity been prevalent among ancient
nations? Yes. Evident traces of the doc-
trine can be discovered in the my-
thology of almost every nation in the
world; and it should be remarked
that the nearer we ascended to the

fountain of traditionary knowledge,
the more correct has been the opinion
of the ancients on this subject.

230 Does this doctrine involve any
contradiction in terms? No as seen before.

230. Can it be comprehended by man? No
and that both because it is but parti-
ally revealed, and because of the im-
possibility of finite creatures embrac-
ing completely what relates to an in-
finite God.

230. Is the word Trinity to be found in S.P.
and is it proper to use? The word it-
self is not ^{found} ~~used~~ in S.P. but it still should
be used because of its utility, in defining
the precise meaning of those who receive
the doctrine it contains. It is absolutely
necessary in expounding scripture that
words not found in the Bible should
often be employed.

231. Is this doctrine revealed in the O.T.? In
Yes. Though like other of parts of plan of

of divine truth, with much less clear-
ness than under the Gospel dispensa-
tion. That it was revealed is proved
1. from Gen. 1. 26 where God says "let us
make man in our image" 2. from
the Spirit being said "to brood upon
the waters" And from such expressions
as these "I will save them by Jehovah their
God" 3 from the history of the creation
which is attributed to each of the
three persons of the Trinity. 4 from
the liberation from Egypt. which is
also ascribed to each of the divine per-
sons. "I am the Lord thy God which
brought thee out of the Land of Egypt."
Exod. 3. 2. - 23. 10. - 32. 34. The Angel
of the Lord is said to have done it.
That this Angel was also God, appears
from his being called the "God of Abra-
ham Isaac & Jacob." Exodus. 3. 6. see also
14. 19. & 19. 21. - 23. 20. &c. This work is ascrib-
ed to the Spirit Isaiah. 63. 7. 8. 9. — 5 from

The descriptions of the Messiah. — 6 from
the threefold benediction of the high
Priest Num. 6. 23. 24. and from the Trisa-
gion. Isa. 6. 3. — 7 all those passages apert-
ing the Unity of the Son and Spirit — 8
The same Being is God both of the O. and
N. T. — This doctrine is found explain-
ed with wonderful clearness in Jewish
writers before the Advent.

232. Is it a fundamental doctrine in the
christian system? Yes. so far as to be-
lieve there is but one God, that the Fa-
ther Son & H. Spirit having the divine
perfections ascribed to them are ~~that~~
God, though distinguished from each
other by those acts and relations we are
accustomed to call personal. This is
proved. 1. from John 17. 3. "This is eternal
life, that they might know thee, the
only true God, & Jesus Christ whom thou
hast sent." — 2. because it contains the great
object of faith & worship. 1. Jo. 2. 23 He that

saith The Son, The same hath not
The Father." — 3. because on this depends
the doctrines of the incarnation, atone-
ment, the mission of the Spirit, regene-
ration &c. — 4. because it is the great dis-
tinguishing doctrine between christian-
ity and Judaism Mahometanism &c.

233. How does it appear that there are
three distinct persons in the divine es-
sence? An. 1. from the baptism of Christ
Mat. 3. 16. Where the Father spake from
heaven, the Son ascended from the Jordan
and the Spirit descended from above in
the form of a dove and rested upon him
— 2. from our Baptism Mat. 28. 19. Teach all
nations baptizing them in the name
of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. — 3
from the Apostolic benediction 2 Cor.
13. 13. "The Grace of the L. of Christ, the love
of God, and the communion of the
Holy Ghost be with you all" — 4. Those
places in which mention is made of

Three to whom divine works are equal
ly attributed. as. Joh. 15. 26. 1 Cor. 12. 256.

34. Is the word person to be taken in its
common and definite sense? No. The word
person when applied to the Deity, is dis-
tinguish from the term as applied to
men 1. Divine persons are in substance
perfectly one & the same with and in one
another: but all created persons are sep-
arable. 2 Divine persons are the same in
dividual substance: but created persons
can only have the same kind of sub-
stance. 3. All Divine persons are and
must be one and the same being; but
every created person is a distinct being.
Brown defines a person "a thinking sub-
stance, which can act by itself." Calvin's
definition is a "Subsistentia in the essence
of the Deity, by which it is related to
others, yet distinguished by incommu-
nicable properties" Melancthon is an Indi-
vidual subsistence, living, intelligent, in

communicable, not sustained by any other and not a part of any other."

235. Is the distinction of persons real or modal?

An. The Divine persons are said to differ from the divine essence, ut modus a re being the thing itself with personal properties. It is also real & essential.

236. Does not the doctrine of three distinct persons lead to Trithism? No. for the three persons are the same essence.

237. By what properties are the persons of Trinity distinguished? They are distinguished 1 by what relates to themselves, in regard to each other. 2 by their external operations. First. The Father is said to be unbegotten, the Son begotten, the Holy Ghost to have proceeded. Secondly the Father is said to work of himself, the Son to work from the Father, the Spirit from both.

238. Are the personal properties communicable? They are not.

239. Do the terms Father & Son express
the eternal relation of the first and
second persons? This was universally the
opinion of Christians during the early
ages of the Church. Noell in ^{was}
the first, who admitting the Godhead
of the second Person, denied his eternal
filiation. Lurretine argues for the doc-
trine against the Socinians 1. From Psal
2. 7. "Thou art my son this day have I begot-
ten thee" 2 from Prov. 8. 22. 23. "The Lord pos-
sessed me in the beginning of his ways &c"
3 from Mich. 5. 2. "His goings forth were of old
even from everlasting" 4. from the nature
of his sonship. 5 from his being called the
"Image of the invisible God." Col. 1. 15. & Heb. 1. 3.
It is further urged in favour of this doc-
trine that the Son is represented as sent
1 Joh. 4. 9. 10. Gal. 4. 4. — 2. "God was manifest-
ed in the flesh" Tim. 2. 16. "The Son was mani-
fested" 1 John. 3. 8. Hence ~~the~~ ^{the Son} must have exis-
ted as God & as the Son previous to his advent.

3. In Heb 1.2. God is said to have made all things by his Son. which implies his pre-existence as the Son. 2. In 7.3. We are told that Melchizedec was made like the son of God without beginning of days.

240. Is Christ called the Son of God in all-
currence to his incarnation? An. Those who
answer the preceding question in the neg-
ative, answer this affirmatively ~~vice versa.~~

241. Does the Holy Spirit proceed from
the Son as well as the Father? This ques-
tion was long and warmly debated be-
tween the Greek and Latin churches
the Greeks contended that the procession
was from the Father only. The Latins
that it was both from the Father and
the Son. The opinion of the Latins ap-
pears to be best supported by the sense
of Scripture, because 1. The Spirit is said
to be sent by the Son as well as by the
Father. 2. Because the Spirit of the Son not
less than the Spirit of the Father is said

to be given Gal. 4. 6. — 3^d Because what the Spirit has is said to be of the Son. John 16. 13. 14. 15. — 4th Because Christ breathed the Spirit upon his disciples. Joh. 20. 22.

242. From what sources is the evidence of Christ's divinity derived? From the names, attributes, offices, and works ascribed to him in the sacred scriptures.

243. By what names and titles of the true God is he called? Jehovah, God, The Lord of Hosts, The Almighty, The Most High. Mark 5. 7. Luke 8. 28. The Everlasting Father Ps. 9. 6. John. 14. 11. Prince of Peace. Luke 1. 76. &c.

244. Are these names never applied to mere creatures? The epithet God is sometimes figuratively ascribed to Angels and Magistrates. But not so with the rest.

245. Is the name Jehovah ever ascribed ^{to} Christ and is it communicable? In This name as it expresses the incommu-

nicable essence of the Deity, and im-
plies necessary, independent, and eternal
existence; is most clearly peculiar to the
only true God. It is applied to Christ
as Redeemer. 11. 60. 16. & 63. 7. 8. 9. Jeremiah pro-
phesied that a righteous Branch should
be raised to David. a king, in whose
days Judah should be saved, whose name
should be called Jehovah our Righteous-
ness. Jer. 23. 6. Zechariah 12. 10. "They shall
look on me whom they have pierced &c"
here the name Jehovah is used, and this
passage is by John referred to Christ. see
also. Isaiah. 47. 4. - 54. 5. 8. Jer. 23. 15. 16. - see Ap. p. 8
246. What divine attributes are ascribed
to Christ? Eternity. Prov. 8. 22. 23. Micah 5. 2
"his goings forth were of old even from ever-
lasting." Apoc. 1. 8. "The first and the Last" 10
1. 1. & 8. 58. - Omnipresence. "When two or
three are gathered together in my name," Mat
18. 20. - Jo. 3. 13. - Col. 1. 17. Heb. 1. 3. - Omnipotence.
Apoc. 1. 8. "The Almighty" Phil. 3. 21. Rev. 11. 17 & 18.

22. 12. 13. 20. Omniscience Joh. 21. 17. "Lord thou knowest all thing." Jo. 1. 18. 2. 25. Mat 9. 23 Rev. 2. 13. Heb. 4. 13. . Immutability Heb. 1. 11. 12. "The heavens shall perish, but thou remainest - thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail" Heb. 13. 8. Ps. 102. 22-27.

247. What works is he said to have wrought which proves his divinity? The creation Preservation & Redemption of the world.

248. By what passages of the L.P. do you prove that Christ created the world? Joh. 1. 3. "By him were all things made, and without him was not any thing made that was made" Heb. 1. 2. 3. 10. Col. 1. 16. 17.

249. Is Jesus Christ declared in the L.P. to be the preserver of all things? Yes. Heb. 1. 3. "Up holding all things by the word of his power" also. John. 5. 17. 19. Col. 1. 17. 18.

250. How do you prove that the new creation is his proper work? Because Redeeming, calling, Justifying, Sanctifying, Preserving, and at ^{last} Raising sinners all

ascribed to him in S.P. Mat. 20. 28. Acts 20

28. — John. 5. 21. 25. 10. 16 — Mat. 9. 6. Isa. 53. 11.

Col. III. 13. — Eph. 5. 28. 29. Heb. 13. 12. 9. 14 — Joh. 10. 10. 28.

Jude 1. — Joh. 5. 28. 1 Pet. III. 18.

251. Do the miracles of Christ prove his divinity? Yes. because some of these required almighty and hence incommunicable power, yet they were performed by his own inherent virtue, and thus the Apostles declare they act in the name & through the power of Christ. Acts. 9. 34.

252 What worship is ascribed to the Son in the S.P.? Divine. as Heb. 1. 6. "Let all the Angels of God worship him" Ps. 2. 12. "Kiss the Son" Joh. 5. 22. The Father hath given all judgement to the Son, that all men might honour the Father even as they honour the Father" Apoc. 5. 13 Every creature in Heaven, earth, & sea. are represented as saying "Blessing and honour and glory and power be unto him that sitteth on the Throne and unto

him that sitteth on the Lamb for
ever and ever"

253. Did he permit divine worship to
be paid him when on earth? Matt. 21
The wise men of the east "fell down
and worshiped him" So did Natha-
niel and Thomas and his disciples
when he ascended. - He required this
worship in commanding his disci-
ples to believe in him as they believ-
ed in God. Joh. 14. 1. - in requiring su-
preme love. Joh. 21. 15-17. Mark 12. 30. - al-
so obedience and subjection of soul Mat.
17. 5. - in instituting Baptism. &c. &c.
see App. p. 9.

254. Does he receive divine honour in
heaven? Yes. as seen above.

255. Is the famous text 1 John 5. 7 a part
of authentic scripture? This question has
been very much disputed. The Text has
been defended by Bengelius, Mills, Horse-
ley and others, and opposed by Father
Simon, Metstein, Griesbach and Thoma.

majority of modern commentators. The testimony as it stands at present is decidedly against ~~the~~ ^{it} the text, is not found in any of the Greek Codices now extant, nor in any of the ancient versions nor in the Russian copies of the Bible before the 12th cent. nor is it quoted by any of the early Fathers. [It is urged in favour of it, that it is found in the Complutensian polyglot published AD 1520. - and in the Latin codices which reach as high up as the 9th cent. - that it is quoted by Vigilius Tapsensis about the 6th cent. - and that it is now so common in all editions of the Bible.]

256. Are the texts Acts 20. 28. & 1. Tim. 3. 16 authentic as contained in our Bible?

With respect to the last mentioned, it is objected that it is not found in all the Greek codices, nor in the Syriac, Arabic or Latin versions, as it is in our copies. [but is written "he was manifested"]

But as there are only two codices with this reading, they should not be opposed to all the rest. It can also easily be accounted for that this diversity should exist since the ancient M.S.S. were written in capitals, and words which occur frequently are often contracted thus $\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ for $\tau\alpha\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ and $\Theta\varsigma$ for $\Theta\epsilon\Theta\varsigma$, which shews that $\Theta\varsigma$ "who" might easily be mistaken for $\Theta\Theta$ "God". And there is a dispute whether it is $\Theta\varsigma$ or $\Theta\Theta$ in the Codex Alexandrinus even among those who have inspected the M.S. The sense of the passage appears to require the reading adopted in our Bibles. - With respect to the text in Act 20. 28. There are three different readings $\epsilon\kappa\kappa\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ - $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\kappa\upsilon\varsigma\iota\omicron\upsilon$ - & $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ $\kappa\upsilon\varsigma\iota\omicron\upsilon$ $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$. for the first there are a few M.S.S. with the Vulgate, and latter Syriac. - for the second some M.S.S. and these the most ancient, & the Coptic Armenian Ethiopic versions. - for the third there is a great majority

of M. L. P. —

25. Have any important texts been made
to support the Divinity of I. C. by at-
tending to the Greek article? Yes. It has
been ascertained that that kai is often exe-
getical as well as copulative, & that this is
the case when it is placed between nouns
the first of which has an article and the
latter has none. 2 Cor. 1.3. Blessed be God
and, even as it should be rendered! The Father
of our Lord I. C. ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ see also Eph. 1.3.
2. Thess. 2.16. 1 Pet. 1.3. Rom. 15.6. Phil. 4.20. Col. 2.2.
Upon this principle the following pas-
sages strongly teach the deity of Christ. Titus
2.13. Looking for that blessed hope & the glo-
rious appearing of the great God kai even
our Saviour Jesus Christ." so 1 Tim 5. 21
"I charge thee before God (kai) even the
Lord Jesus Christ." also Eph. 5.5 "Kingdom
of Christ even kai of God." — & 2 Thess 1. 12 ^{of} the
grace τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμεῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. see
1 Tim 5. 13. — 2. Pet. 1.2. — Sharpe & Middleton,

58. What ^{light} arises on this subject by comparing the texts of the O. & N. Testament? An
It is found, that the names, works &
titles which in the O.T. are ascribed to
the true God, are in the N.T. applied to
Jesus Christ. compare Ps. 7. 14. with Mat. 1. 23
Ps. 63. 11 with Luke 2. 11. Ps. 3. 8 with 2 Cor 3. 18
Ps. 77. 15. with Luke 1. 51. Ps. 104. 24. Mat.
11. 19. - 1 Sam. 15. 29. with 2 Cor 12. 9. - 1s 52. 5
with 2 Cor 11. 2. - Ps. 8. 12. with Rom. 9. 33.

59. How does it appear that the Holy
Spirit is a person distinct from the Fa-
ther and the Son? First, from personal
actions being ascribed to him, as teaching
Joh. 14. 26. witnessing Joh. 15. 26, revealing
future things 1 Tim. 4. 1, separating ^{men} for the
ministry and sending them out. Act. 13. 2
& 20. 28. conferring gifts on men. 1 Corin. 12. 11
Secondly, from our Saviour saying, Joh. 16. 7
"I have will ask the Father, and he will
send you another comforter" - Thirdly, from
the distinct mention made of him in Prop

tism, in the Apostolic benediction. - Fourthly - from his appearing in a visible form at the Baptism of Christ Mat. 3. 16. at the day of Pentecost Acts 2. 13. Fifthly - because men are said, to sin, to blaspheme, to lie, against the Holy Ghost. Lk. 63. 10. Matt. 12. 31. 32. Acts 5. 3. - See Ap. page 10.

260. How can the divinity of the H. Spirit be established? An. From the names works attributes and worship ascribed to him in sacred scriptures.

261. What divine names &c are given to the Holy Spirit in the S.P.? An. The names Levana of hosts compare Ps. 6. 9. with Acts 28. 25 "well speak the Holy Ghost by Isaiah" - 2 Sam. 23. 2. 2^d Most High God. Ps. 78. 56. Heb. III. 17. 6. - 3^d The Lord 2 Thes. 2. 5. Matt. 9. 38. - Secondly. Attributes 1. Eternity. Heb. 9. 14 Who through the eternal Spirit 2. Omnipresence. Ps. 139. "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit" 1 Cor. III. 16. 2 Tim. 1. 14. - Om niscience. 1 Cor. II. 10. 11 "For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God." 2 Pet.

21. Omnipotence. Luke 1.35. "The power of the High
est." 1. Cor. 15. Rom. 8.11. Thirdly works, that of
creation. Ps. 104. 30 "Thou sendest forth thy
spirit they are created, thou renewest the
face of the earth" Gen. 1. 2. Job. 26. 13. Preserving
all things. Ps. 104. 30. Is. 44. 16. Performing mira-
cles. Math. 12. 28. 1 Cor. 12. 4. - Convincing men
of sin. Jo. 16. 9. Enlightening their minds
Eph. 1. 17. 18. Regenerating their hearts. Jo. 1. 11.
5. 6. - 4. Fourthly worship. by prayer. Rev. 1. 4
2. Thes. 3. 5. in Baptism. 1. 2.

262. How can it be demonstrated that these
persons are one in essence? First. Because
these ³ persons are all comprehended under
~~under~~ one supreme individual appella-
tion. as Is. 44. 24. "I am the Lord that ma-
keth all things, that stretcheth forth the
heavens alone &c" The Trinity is the God of
Israel. &c. Secondly They have in common
the name Jehovah Deut. 6. 4. "The Lord our
God is one Jehovah" Ps. 83 "Thou whose name
alone art Jehova, art most high over all the

earth" Thirdly. Because the authority, the council and the power by which all things are directed are ascribed to Christ & the Holy Spirit in common with the Father. Fourthly because they participate in those divine attributes, which can belong only to the divine essence. There can be but one infinite Being. Fifthly. because. There is a concurrence in all the acts of the Godhead. The Trinity made all mankind. Quickens the dead, instructs us. &c. &c.

263. How does it appear that they are equal in all respects? This necessarily results from their respective Divinity. They have the same names worship, works & nature, and therefore must be equal and in essence the same. Those passages of S. P. ^{in which} any inferiority is attributed to the Son or Spirit refer merely to the different parts they have condescended to act in economy of Redemption. Quare, Gloria Patri, et Filio, et Spiritui Sancto in eternum.

Decrees

264. What are the Decrees of God and how does it appear that they exist? They are called the "essential internal acts of God." They are his eternal purposes. Their existence is proved from the perfection of the divine nature, his knowledge being infinite and infallible, supposes that he has determined things to be as they are. 2. They are proved from the harmony observable in creation and Providence. 3. They are constantly ascribed to God in the S.P. 4. They are also proved by the production of things the most contingent. Amos. iii. 7. Mat. 8. 17. Joh. 19. 36.

265. What kind of acts are the decrees of God? The acts of God are divided into three kinds. 1. Those internal acts which have no relation to beings without. 2. external transient acts, as creation &c. 3. Those internal acts of God which ^{have} a reference to things without. Of this last kind are the Decrees, being the coun-

cils of God concerning future things without himself.

266. Are the divine Decrees essentially or accidentally in the divine nature? They cannot be considered as accidents in the divine nature, for this would be inconsistent ^{with} simplicity, contrary to absolute perfection, and opposed to immutability for accidents are the root of all change. And this is as much as is necessary to be said on this subject, for we cannot easily conceive of Decrees being the divine of sense of which they are the internal act.

267. Are all The decrees of God from eternity? Yes because this is attributed to them in the S.P. as when, The kingdom is said to be prepared for the righteous "from the foundation of the world" Mat 25:14 also elected, Eph. 1.4. 2. Tim 1.9. also from Acts 15.18. "known unto the Lord are all things from the beginning of the world"

~~But~~ If the decrees are made in time

Then after the manner of men ~~acts~~
from the circumstances of the moment
which is altogether inconsistent with
his infinite perfection.

268. Are the decrees of God immutable?

Yes. There may be changes in the external dispensations of his providence, but there can be none in his purpose, because this would argue some defect in his foreknowledge, wisdom, or power. Ps. "The counsel of the Lord standeth forever the thoughts of his heart to all generations" 33. 11. - Heb 6. 17 "Wherein God willing more abundantly to shew the immutability of his counsel"

269. Are the decrees of God wise & free? Yes. This appears from his wisdom, & sovereignty, manifested in the execution of them. For whatever perfections God manifests in his works, these he designed in his eternal purpose to glorify. - Rom. 11. 33. "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom & knowledge of God." - Mat. 11. 26. Even so Father for so it seemeth

eth good in thy sight."

270. Are the decrees of God absolute or conditional? The decrees of God are all absolute considered in themselves. 1st because they are from eternity. 2^d because they ^{are} dependent only on the good pleasure of God. Mat. 15. 25. Eph. 1. 5. 3^d because they are immutable Ps. 115. 10. 4th because it is inconsistent with the wisdom and power of God to make decrees which have uncertain objects. 5th because it makes the purposes of God dependent on the fickle will of man. Ps. 115. 10 "Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things which are not yet done, saying my counsel shall stand & I will do all my pleasure."

271. May they not be considered as conditional in regard to their object? That may, i.e. the event or object is decreed under a condition, thus salvation, under the condition of faith. But this mode of

speaking confounds conditions and means.

72 Do the decrees of God involve the certainty of future events? Certainty or as Turretine says necessity is of three kinds
1 Physical, such as resides in second causes, e.g. fire will burn. 2 That of coercion.
3 hypothetical necessity of the event, by which things in their nature contingent cannot but take place, on account of the ordination of God. In this last sense things decreed are necessary or rather certain. 1. because the eternal and immutable purposes of God must take effect. 2. because this necessity is asserted in S.P.: Matt. 18. ~ "For it must needs be that offences come" ch. 26. 54. But how then shall the scriptures be fulfilled that thus it must be." 3 because the most casual things are said to come to pass of necessity Exod. 21. 12, 13. Prov. 16. 33. John 19. 36. 4. They are foreseen as future, and

Therefore must take place. 5 They are predicted as future, and the word of God cannot fail. see Ed. P+2. Lect. 11th

243 Does the decree of God make him the Author of sin? No. because the decree though it may render sin certain is not the cause of sin, since it neither imports the evil disposition from whence it flows, nor intimates the least approbation of it. but is merely permissive. There is a great difference between allowing sin, and causing it. ~~But~~ It may be considered as the Tolai Star of Theologs, to remember that God is infinitely perfect, and to ascribe to him nothing which is not consistent with this character. see Edwards on 1st Mo P+2 P. 4.

244. How are the decrees of God conversant about the free acts of moral agents? God uses all things agreeably to the nature he has given them. He works with necessary causes in one way, and with contingent

causes in another, violating the nature of neither, yet accomplishing his purposes by both.

275. Is there any just ground for a distinction between absolute & permissive decrees? There is, in a certain view, God decrees all good absolutely, and is the cause of it, but he permits evil, though the decree to permit is in itself absolute.

276. What is a permissive decree? Such as relate to sinful actions. "A permissive determines the event if evil permitted & overrules it to a good end contrary to its intention both of the work and the worker" *Lichfield*. It merely determines the certainty of its event.

277. Are all things even the most minute decreed? Nothing is so vast, or so minute, ^{as} to be beyond the limits of God's providence or plan. The hairs of our heads are all numbered; and a sparrow shall not fall to the ground without the notice of our heavenly Father.

Predestination.

278. Does the word Predestination include reprobation, as well as election? In the *St.* the word is more frequently used in application to election only, but most divine now extend it to embrace both. Because the word προορισμ is often used in reference to wicked actions, and because reprobation is expressed by φθασ, perfectly synonymous with Predestina^{tion}.

279. Were Angels predestinated as well as men? Yes. Paul says to Timothy "I charge thee before God and the elect Angels." 1 Tim. 5. 22. If some were elected or chosen it implies that others were left, or reprobated. who are said to be reserved in chains & darkness to the great judgement.

280. Is man as fallen the object of predestination? This is generally the opinion among orthodox divines, in opposition to those who suppose that man

as createable was the object of God's pre-
destinating decrees. First because, that
which does not exist cannot be the
object of a positive decree. Second because
~~if~~ ^{was} man as createable, the object of
predestination, then either all created
ble men, or only a part of them must
have been predestinated, but it is evi-
dent that all were not, and if but
a part were. They must have been
foreseen as certainly future &c. Thirdly
if man as createable & fallable was
the object of predestination, then the
creation and fall are means of pre-
destination, which they cannot be,
otherwise ^{God} would have entered into a
decree to save or destroy man, before
he had determined his creation or his
fall. Fourth. because this doctrine
makes God to reprobate men, before ^{that}
through sin, they were liable to repro-
bation. - It may moreover be further

argued in favour of man as fallen
being the object of predestination. Fi-
rst because the saints are said to be
chosen out of the world Joh. 15. 19. Se-
cond. from Paul's figure of the Map
from which the vessels of honour &
dishonour were made Rom. 9. 21. This
map represented the object of predesti-
nation, which, with it, must have
been corrupt. Third. because the il-
lustration of the mercy and justice of
God in election & reprobation, suppo-
ses the object of these decrees to be al-
ready miserable or sinful.

281. Does not a wise agent always de-
termine the ends before the means?
This principle is the ground of the
famous axiom of Lewis "that which is
last in execution, was first in design"
which Turretine says holds with re-
gard to the ultimate end, but ^{not} to all
others, which would prove, that, what

next to last in execution, must have been next to last in design. &c. It also holds were there is an essentially subordination of things, but there is no such subordination between creation, fall, and redemption. —

82. What is the supralapsarian doctrine in regard to the order of decrees? They make the decrees of election & reprobation to precede the decrees to create, and to permit man to fall.

83. What is the sublapsarian doctrine and wherein does it differ from the other? The sublapsarian doctrine is, that the creation and permission of the fall of man. were decreed, before his election or reprobation. The first of these makes man as createable & fallible, or to be created and to fall as the object of the decree of predestination, The second man as created & fallen.

284. Is there at bottom any difference between these two systems? None. The purposes of God in reference to men may be viewed in the following order. 1. His decree to manifest the glory of his perfections in his dealings with man. 2. His decree of creating and permitting them to fall, 3 His fore appointment of some men to be subjects of mercy others of wrath. 4 His fixing the means necessary for both of these objects.—

285. Did not God determine all things by one most simple act? Yes, the decrees of God may be considered as one most perfect purpose, which destroys all debate relative to their order.

Election.

286 What is election, and of how many kinds? This word sometimes signifies, a vocation to an office, sometimes a selection of a whole people

to be in covenant with God. Also
the gracious act of the Holy Spirit
whereby men are separated from
the world Jon. 15-19. But more pro-
perly or strictly it is that eternal, sov-
ereign, unconditional, particular
and immutable act of God, ^{whereby,} He
chooses some men to everlasting
life through Jesus Christ.

87. How can it be demonstrated
that election is personal? First be-
cause particular persons are said to
have their names written in the book
of life. Secondly because some men are
represented as personally chosen to ev-
erlasting life. Eph. 1. 4. 5. 6. Matt. 20. 16. -
288 Is Christ the cause and founda-
tion of election? No, because election
is made from the mere good pleasure
of God. "I will have mercy on whom I
will have mercy." Second the mission
of Christ was the effect of election.

and consequently cannot be its cause
God so loved the world that he gave
his only begotten son." Thirdly, because
the elect are the object of Christ's me-
rit, and the object must be before the
means. act. Fourthly, the determi-
nation of the end must precede the
the destination of the means. But
salvation is the end, and Christ is
the mean. Thus the desire to heal
the sick precedes the application of
remedies.

289. Is it the same thing to be the founda-
tion of salvation, as of election? No. Christ
is not only the foundation but the only
sole foundation of salvation, though
not of election. For many more cau-
ses are requisite for salvation, than for
election, and the means of election
are the causes of salvation.

290 Has the act of election no respect
to Christ? Yes. It regards him as the

grand means of its accomplishment.
For salvation never was appointed
to man but in reference to Christ,
and God by the same act by which
he determined to redeem his chil-
dren determined, to send them Jesus.

Q. Was election founded on the foresight
of faith and holiness? A. No. First because
faith and obedience are the fruit of elec-
tion. Rom. 8. 29. Whom he predestinated,
them he also ~~sa~~ called. Eph. 1. 2. He hath
chosen us that we might be holy. Acts
13. 48. And as many as were ordained unto
eternal life believed. — Secondly because
election is of the sole good pleasure of God
and not of works. Rom. 9. 11. That the pur-
pose of God according to election ^{might stand} not of works
but of him that calleth. — So then it is not
of him that willeth nor of him that shew-
~~eth~~ ^{eth} ~~runneth~~ ^{eth}, but of God who sheweth Mon-
ey. — Thirdly If election be from the
fore knowledge of faith then man

chose God, rather than God man, but
Christ says "ye have not chosen me but
I have chosen you" John. 15. 16. Fourthly
If election was founded on the fore-
sight of faith, there would be no room
for the objection noticed by Paul in
9th of Romans. to which he simply re-
plies "who art thou &c" De Deo Politano "elect

292 What is meant in the S.L. by the
foreknowledge which precedes election?
This is not a mere theoretical knowledge
but also practical implying approba-
tion and affection, in this sense it is
frequently used in S.L. Joh. 10. 14

That this foreknowledge is not a mere
prescience, appears 1st because with this
he foreknew those whom he reprobates
as well as those whom he elects. 2^d because
mere prescience is not the cause of any
thing. 3^d because nothing can be fore-
seen of God, but what he himself has de-
termined.

23. Is election certain and immutable? Yes.
Because the decree of election like all the
other decrees of God are imm^utable. My
counsel standeth firm, and I will per-
form all my pleasure" Is. 46.10. - "The gifts
and calling of God are without repentance."
Romans 11.29. - see also Heb. 6.17. Rom. 9.11.
Also 2. Tim. 2.19. "The foundation of God stan-
deth firm having this seal the Lord know-
eth those that ^{are} his." - Secondly it is im-
possible to deceive the elect Matt. 24.24.
Thirdly, there is an~~d~~ indissoluble bond
between election and glorification. as ap-
pears from the golden chain exhibited
by the Apostle Rom. 8. 29. 30. Whom he did
foreknow them he did predestinate to
be conformed to the image of his Son, &c."
Fourthly, the names of the elect are said
to be written in heaven. Phil. 4.3. Heb. 12.23.
Luc 10.20. which denotes the infallibility
of their salvation. The wicked are said to
be written in the earth. Lev. 17.13.

294 Can the number of the elect be increased or diminished? No.

295 May believers be assured of their election this life? This ~~is~~ can be known not by ascending into heaven and reading the book of life, but by perusing the book of conscience. Turretine resolves the case into a practical syllogism the Major of which is in the Word and the minor in the heart. Whosoever truly repents and believes shall be so is elected, I repent & believe \therefore electus sum. This further appears from the saints be represented as being certain of faith, which is the fruit of their election "I know in whom I have believed" 2. Tim. 1. 12. Secondly from the witness of the Spirit. Romans 8. 16. "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirits, that we are the children of God." Eph. 2. 30. 1. Joh. 3. 24. Thirdly the example of the saints. Abraham. David Paul. Fourthly the effect is confidence and full assurance, Let us draw near to

& with a true heart and full assurance of
faith. 1. Heb. 10. 22. Eph. 3. 12. 1. Pet. 1. 18. Joh. 16. 22.

40. 296 Will this not lead to security and
licentiousness? No, far from it, because nothing
can be a greater incentive to piety, than a
lively sense of the love of God, and of the
benefits freely bestowed ^{upon} us, no better than
others involved in the same ruin & with them
selves. Besides no man has any evidence
of his being of the elect, unless he leads a
holy life.

297 How do you prove that the decree of God
to save ~~un~~believers, and to condemn un-
believers does not comprehend the whole of
the decree of election? First because predesti-
nation in the S^t. always refers to persons
and not qualities. "Many are called, but
few are chosen" Matt. 20. 16. Whom he did
foreknow them he ^{2nd} predestinate. Secondly
because Predestination is represented to us as
an efficacious will or determination of God.
Thirdly because it has been proved that e-

cession precedes the faith of those who are
finally saved.

298. Is there in God a general will to save all
men? No. which is proved from the decree
of election and reprobation, which is inconsis-
sistent with this general will. Secondly if
God did will the salvation of all would
he not will also the means necessary to
their salvation? Thirdly if God has this gen-
eral will of saving all, this will is either ab-
solute or conditional, if absolute then all
will be saved, if conditional, then he must
either effect in them the necessary condition
or merely require it, if the last, as it is
impossible for man to obey it, the salva-
tion of such he never could have willed.
Fourthly if God will to save all, then ei-
ther all are saved, which is false, or God has
an inefficacious unproductive will, which
is absurd. Fourth he cannot wish to save
those to whom he never sends the neces-
sary means of salvation.

299 Does not the decree of election include the means? An. Yes, they are coordained and inseparably connected.

300 If the means never were used, would an elect sinner be saved? No, for this would be uniting what God has forever separated, vice and felicity, moral evil and physical good. "Without holiness no man shall see the Lord" Heb. 12. 14.

301. Does this doctrine discourage the use of means? It ought not, for the end though fixed, can be obtained only by the use of appointed means, to neglect therefore the one is to forfeit the other. Besides those who urge this excuse for negligence, do not regulate their conduct in regard to temporal things, by the same rule.

302. Had God any reason for electing some and rejecting others of the same mass? An infinitely wise Being, cannot act without a reason, but the reason of prefer

one rather than another resides not in the object of the choice but in God himself.

303. Do we know any reason for this distinction? No. The S^t. refer it to the mere beneplacitum of God.

Reprobation.

304. Can the doctrine of reprobation be separated from that of election? No. The election and salvation of some, implies the preterition and destruction of the rest.

305. Is reprobation properly distinguished into negative and positive? Yes. The first referring to preterition, the second to pre-damnation, both of these are positive as they relate God, inasmuch they require a positive act of the divine will. see App. p. 1

306. Is preterition founded on the sin of its object? Yes if considered separately, i.e. it is necessary that the object of preterition be sinful; but if considered comparatively it is sin is not the foundation of the act of preterition, i.e. it is not the

cause of one rather than another's being left.

307 Is the foresight of unbelief and impenitence the cause of ones being left rather than another? This is to be referred to the mere good pleasure of God as appears from Romans 9. 18 "whom he wills he hardeneth" also from the case of Jacob and Esau & the figure of the potter. Thus our Saviour says even so Father for so it seemeth good ^{to} ~~me~~ ⁱⁿ sight." - unbelief is the ^{consequence} ~~effect~~ of reprobation, and of course could not precede it. "Ye therefore hear them not because ye are not of God" Joh. 8. 47 "But ye believed not, because ye are not of my sheep." And if Reprobation ^{be} founded on the foresight of impenitence, then it is not so great a mystery. And the Apostle would not have attributed it to the sovereignty of God as its only foundation.

308 What is the positive act of reprobation. This includes a destination to perdition

and to the intermediate steps of blindness of mind and hardness of heart, of those whom God had seen proper to leave in the state of corruption, brought on by the fall of man.

309. Is there in it any destination to punishment, without regard to sin? No. punishment always presupposes guilt.

310. Is the positive act of reprobation an act of justice or sovereignty? Of Justice.

311. Is it possible for any man to know in this life that he is reprobated? No. however certain he may be of present enmity to God, he cannot be assured that God has determined to permit him to remain so.

312. Has not this doctrine a tendency to lead men to despair? Not unless abused, but should rather excite them to carefulness and diligence in their walk and conversation.

313. Are the offers of mercy to all men consistent with the reprobation of some? An

Yes, because these offers are not intended as intimations of his will to save all to whom they are made, but to declare the way of salvation and to exhibit their duty to accept of it. Besides God's requiring ^{obedience} from those who hear the Gospel, is the appointed mean of converting the elect, at the same time it renders those who are reprobated more useful and happy in the present world.

Q. 14. Ought the doctrine of Predestination to be publicly preached? Yes. because Christ and Apostles taught it publicly Matt. 11. 20. 25 John. 8. 12. & 15. 17. Secondly because it is one of the most important truths of the gospel, being the fountain of our gratitude and humility towards God, our support in temptation, our consolation in distress and our incitement to piety & holiness. Thirdly to free the doctrine from the calumnies its adversaries cast upon it.

315. How ought it to be preached? With the greatest moderation and prudence, being mindful to keep within the limits prescribed in the L.F. and not being wise above what is written. ~~It~~ respect also should be had to persons, times, and places. Not to deliver ^{it} suddenly to all men but by degrees, most frequently inculcating those part best calculated to be useful. It should be viewed a posteriori, non a priori. be reading the book of conscience, rather than attempting to scan the book of life. Avoiding all vain questions, tot scopus unicus nobis debet fidem instituere, non curiositatem patere, adificationi consulere non gloria relificari.

Creation.

316. How are the acts of God distinguished? Into immanent and intrinsic, immanentibus extrinsic, and transient extrinsic. These last are called his works

and are distinguished in those of nature and those of grace.

317. What sort of an act is creation? It is a transient extrinsic act.

318. Is it a production out of nothing? Yes this is ^{the} proper signification of *ex nihilo* and *creatio*.

319. What is the difference between mediate and immediate creation? Immediate creation is simple production *ex nihilo*. mediate creation is the molding of matter already existing, but so crude as to be within the power of no second cause to arrange it.

320. Can we conceive how something can be produced from nothing? No.

321. Does not creation imply a change in God? No. Because it is an external transient act from God and not in God. It implies no new will nor perfection, but is merely the eternal will and determination of God going into effect. The change is in the creature a non esse ad esse.

322 Is the creating power communica-
ble to any creature? No. First because it
is ascribed to God alone Ps. 44. 7. 24. I am
Jehova who made all things, who stretch-
ed out the heavens alone and spread
abroad the earth by myself. And thus
the ^{name} Creator is given to him alone as
an incommunicable epithet. Secondly
because it is made the characteristic
between the true God & Idols. Jer. 10. 11. 12.
Thirdly because creation is a work of
infinite power. Fourthly because every
creature must have a subject on which
to act or it can do nothing. -

323. Does the working of miracles require
almighty power? There are some that
do. others do not. And if men are
every way employed in performing those
the first kind, they are to be consider-
ed merely as moral instruments.

324. How can it be demonstrated
that this world was not eternal? An

It is proved just by those passages ^{which} expressly declare the world to have been created as "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" and those who express the eternity of ~~from~~ ^{God} by declaring he existed before the foundation of the world. It is also proved from the late invention of useful arts, the short reach of history but to a few thousand years past, from the world's being still far from ~~a~~ completely inhabited, ^{from} the heights which remain on the surface of the earth though they are continually washing down by the rain &c. &c. Besides it is impossible that the world should ^{be} coeternal with its ~~maker~~ ^{creator} neither can any finite creature ~~should~~ be eternal.

325. At what season of the year was the world created? Some are of opinion that it was in the spring, but most divine refer it to the fall. First because

The Israelites began their civil year in Egypt in the fall. 2. the deluge probably commenced in the fall. The season for rearing, but it was the second month. 3. The 'sabbatical year commenced in the fall. 4. it is would be most convenient for man and other animals that the earth should be created with all its fruits.

326. Was the world created in a single moment or in six days? Augustin was of opinion that the world was created in a moment, and the days mentioned by Moses refer to the knowledge of Angels. but this is opposed to the simple narration of Moses, to the worlds being without form & void. & to the account of the institution of the sabbath. Notwithstanding ^{this} the respective work of each day must have ^{been} the effect of but a momentary exertion of omnipotence.

What was the order of creation in the six
successive days? In the first day were crea-
ted Heaven, Earth, & Light. By the first of
these is meant particularly the "third hea-
vens", - by the earth chaotic matter. - by
light a lucid body collected in one part of
the hemisphere, to distinguish between the
day and night. - The work of the second
day was the creation of the firmament
or expanse, i.e. the atmosphere, and the
division of the waters above from those
below the expanse, i.e. the clouds from
the waters mixed through the earth.
- The work of the third day was the col-
lection of the waters, and the produc-
tion of the herbs and fruits of the earth.
On the fourth were created the Sun
Moon & stars. On the fifth the fowls
and fish were produced. And on the
sixth all terrestrial animals, together
with Man, the Lord of this lower world.
quoddam universitatis compendium

328 When was man created and how? He was created on the sixth day, from the dust of the earth, and in the image of God.

329. Is there any evidence that men existed before Adam? None, and the whole current of scripture is against the opinion 1 Cor. 15. 45. The first man was made a living soul. — Eve is called the mother of all living. Gen. 3. 20. — He must have been the first man by whom sin passed upon all men, and this was Adam. — All men are called the children of Adam. Ps. 82. 2. — If men existed before Adam there must be for them a new church, and a new plan of salvation.

330. Was man created in puris naturalibus i.e. without moral qualities? No. First, because man was made in the image of God, & thus good and righteous. Eccles. 7. 29. Secondly because he was made for the glory and worship of God Prov. 16. 4. Rom. 11. 36.

for which both wisdom and holiness were requisite. Thirdly because were two qualities directly opposed to each can be predicated of the same subject, one or the other must belong to that subject. And Fourth. This state of pura natura is a mere fancy supported by no evidence.

31. In what did the image of God in which man was created consist? It consisted ^{ed} neither in any participation of the Divine essence, which can be ascribed only of the Son, nor in any similitude in outward appearance. But in his Nature Righteousness, Dominion and Immortality. - To the first of these pertain the substance of the human soul, being spiritual, incorruptible, and immortal, endowed with intelligence & will. - The second original Righteousness consisting in wisdom of mind, holiness of will, & rectitude of affections together with the most perfect harmony among all his faculties. That man was deprived of this original righteousness is

proved First Gen. 1.31. "God saw all this, which he had made, that they were very good." and from Eccles. 9. 24. "God made man upright." Secondly the image which is restored to us by grace, and perfected in heaven must be the same as that in which man was created, for it is called a renovation. Thirdly because God made man perfect, and this perfection was not merely voluntary, i.e. arising from holy acts of the will, but supposes a holy principle whence those actions flow. And lastly original righteousness was necessary to enable man to serve God, or exercise his dominion over creatures.

- The Third constituent of this image of God is the Dominion given to man over the creature of this lower world, and also his ~~interior~~ Immortality.

332. Was the first man immortal before the fall? Yes. Because man was made in the image of God which supposes immortality. Secondly because, if Adam was holy, he

he ought to be immortal. since God has
connected inseparably righteousness & life
sin and death, and from the nature of
things moral good & physical good must
be united, and vice versa. Blindly A-
dam incurred death by sin. Gen. 2. 17. & 3. 19.
hence death is said to have entered by sin
and to be its wages. Rom. 5. 12. & 6. 23. — How-
ever what is contrary to nature, cannot
be a consequent of nature. Lastly no cause
of death existed before the fall.

333 Was original righteousness natural or su-
p^{er}natural? Natural. i.e. # it was neces-
sary to the perfection of his nature, and
was one of the natural gifts conferred on
man in the state of integrity. But did
not belong essentially to nature. There is
a difference between constituent faculties
and moral principles, a change in the
first implies a change of species, but not
so of the other. That it is natural, ^{appears too} because
whatever is transmitted ad posterum must

be natural, and had Adam remain^{ed} holy he would have propagated an holy nature as he ^{did} a corrupt one after his fall. - The remain^{ing} of original righteousness are natural. - If original righteousness be supernatural, then the want of it must be natural. - Natural ends require natural means, it was the natural end of man to honour God and be happy for which original righteousness is necessary.

334. Are human souls created immediately, or propagated extrinsecally? Junettine and most other divines, embrace the opinion of immediate creation and argue in favour of it, 1st from the Law of Creation. 2^d The testimony of scripture. 3^d from Reason. - In regard the first he says our souls ought to have the same origin, as that of Adam, - The texts of S.P. he produces are Eccles. 12. 9. "The dust returneth to the earth as it was but the Spirit returned to God who gave it." Zach. 12. 1. The word of the Lord which

stretcheth out the heavens, and layeth
the foundations of the earth, and formeth
the spirit of man within him." Heb 12. 9
"The Father of our spirits" &c. — The reasons
he urges against it are drawn from the
difficulties of accounting for the mode in
which this propagation is effected.

10th A unites the two opinions, and con-
^{the authors of}siders human parents as much ^{the} ^{body}
as of the body, that God creates them
both, yet both produced by means of pa-
rents, so that in common they partake
of Adam's nature. The soul never had
an existence separate from ^{the} ^{body} ^{he}, and
from the first moment of its being belong-
to the guilty race of man.

335. Were human souls created all at
once or successively as men are born? An-
As men are born.

336. Is the soul of man immortal in its
own nature? Yes. All scripture is found-
ed upon the immortality of the soul

Mat. 22. 32. - 10. 28. and those places in wh
eternal life is promised, or eternal death
threatened. - From the Providence of
God - his truth & wisdom require it. The
desire of immortality proves it. - Spirit
uality. - Independence of the body. - The
consent of all nations.

337 Were all worlds created during the
six days mentioned in Gen? We have no
reason to think they were not.

338 When were angels created? This is not
a subject of revelation. Most Divine sup
pose they were included the works of the
six days, the principal argument in fa
vour of which is, that ^{what} was before the founda
tion of the world, is in the language
of S. P. from eternity. Ps. 91. 2. Prov 8. 22. -

But this supposition allows too little
time for the fall of those kept ^{who} not their
first estate, for the Devil's determining ⁱⁿ on
the destruction of man, & his effecting his
ruin

Providence.

39 What is the meaning of the word Providence? The corresponding greek word is *προνοια* from *προνοειν* *proi*, and has been considered as including, the foreknowledge, decree, & government of God. But more properly it belongs to the execution and direction of what from eternity he had decreed.

40. How does it appear that there is a providence? I. from the voice of nature & consent of nations. II. from scripture. III. from the nature of God. IV. from the nature of creatures. &c

41. What opinion did the wise Heathen entertain on this subject? Plato ^{says} "quod dii curant omnia, parva et magna." Aristotle says whatever a pilot, charioteer, leader, lawgiver, general are in their respective situations the same is God in the world. The Stoics, held the ^{same} opinions. Seneca and Cicero both write on the subject.

342 What is the doctrine of Scripture on the subject of Providence? The S.L. uniformly represent God, ^{not} merely as the creator of all things, but as the constant upholder and director of all things. See particularly Job. chapters from 12 to 41. Psalms. 8. 19. 91. 102. 107. Prov. 16 & 20. Matt. 6 & 10. Acts. 14. & 17. This is taught also by three great symbols
I mount Moria where Isaac was rescued
II hence the phrase יהוה יראתיה Dominus providet
III Jacob's ladder IV The wheel of Ezekiel.

343 Can any argument be derived from the nature of God in favour of a Providence. A Yes, because his interference is as necessary for the support, as for the creation of the world, & from him all second causes derive their efficacy. The doctrine may also be infered from his wisdom, power, and goodness.

344. How can a Providence be demonstrated a posteriori? First from the nature and condition of creatures, which

require the continued support and protection of God. Psalm. 104. 28. 29 "Thou hidest thy face and they are troubled, Thou takest away their breath and they die, & return to their dust &c." II from the harmony and order observable in the world. III from the accomplishment of prophecies IV from the revolutions of states and empires. which prove that it is by the Lord that Kings reign, & Princes decree justice Prov. 8. 15. V from remarkable mercies and judgements. VI from conscience.

345 Does not every argument for the existence of God prove his providence? Yes, they are inseparably connected, if there is a God he must be everywhere present, beholding the evil & the good, and if present must be actively so. Hence the sacred writers distinguish the true God from Idols by referring to his Providence, & they were ^{considered} Atheists who denied the one as much as those who

denied the other.

346. Does the doctrine of providence destroy contingency? In theological language contingency is opposed to necessity, and every thing, which in the nature of things might be otherwise than it is, is said to be contingent. This the providence of God does ^{not} remove, because things remain indifferent, in relation to second causes though certain in reference to the First.

347. Does it take away liberty & the use of means? No, for the certainty it induces is merely hypothetical, arising from the decree of God, and implies no coercion on the will, ~~though~~ ^{which} it acts inevitably while it acts freely. In respect to the use of means, the certainty of the end does not destroy, but suppose the necessity of the means, and the concurrence of the first cause does not exclude the concurrence of second causes, but draws them after it.

348 In what way does sin take place in the providence of God? By his permission & efficacious direction, but it is by no means produced efficiently by him.

349. How can the prosperity of the wicked and the calamities of the pious consist with providence? Although the justice and providence of God require that it should be well with the righteous & ill with the wicked they do not require that always it should manifestly be thus. For there is great wisdom, in permitting some crimes in this world to go unpunished to shew ^{that} this is not the state of retribution. Moreover did we view things aright we should not decide that every trial the believer meets with, is an evil, or that the prosperity of the wicked is ^{always} a good.

350 Does the doctrine of providence involve a fatal necessity? It does not as this term is general received.

351. What is fate, Physical, Mathematical
Stoical, & Christian? The word is derived
from fando loquendo. The Greeks used
the word εἰμασμεν a power to divide. also
ὁρμησμεν ordinatum. ἀπὸ τῶν termino.

Physical Fate is nothing ^{more} than the necessary connection between cause and effect. Mathematical Fate. is that, supposed to arise from the influence of the stars, ^{was held} of course ~~belonged~~ only to believers in Astrology. - Stoical Fate. according ^{to} Chrysippus ~~is~~ is the "natural connection and order of all things from eternity, ~~the~~ one succeeding to others, & this chain remaining immutable". Cicero calls it the "order or series of causes &c". Seneca makes it an irrevocable necessity controlling the course of both human & divine affairs, so that the supreme Ruler though he governs continually obey". This Fate differs from Christian necessity, because it places the necessity of things without God, whereas

The latter refers ^{it} to his eternal decree. — it also subjects God himself to this necessity, but the other subject the necessity to God. — again it confounds all causes, but the christian fate distinguishes between natural, & free causes & preserves both.

Christian Fate is the order or series of causes dependent on divine providence, by which it produces its effects. see App. B

352. Ought christians to retain and use the word Fate? No. for whatever ideas those who use the term may attach to it, it has so long been used in a sense inconsistent with truth on this subject, that it will certainly be misunderstood.

353 Does providence extend to all things small as well as great? Yes. because he created all things and therefore cares for all. This is ascribed to God in the S. S. first generally as Ischem. 9. 6. "Thou even thou art Lord alone, Thou hast made heaven and the heaven of heavens with all their

host, the earth and all things that are therein, the sea and all that is therein, & thou preservest them all." And particularly in such passages as Luke 12. 7 were the hairs of our heads are said to be numbered. - So in Matt. 10. 29. & 6. 28 Ps. 124. 9. were the fowls of the air, the tillies in the field. & even insects are said to be under the care of God.

354. Is an attention to things minute & vile incompatible with the majesty of God? An. No, if he saw fit to create them why not to preserve them? besides it exalts our idea of the wisdom, & power of God which can be exercised with ^{equal} ease over the things the most stupendous & the most minute.

355. How does it appear that fortuitous and contingent events are regulated by Providence? Because in the S.^t the direction of such circumstances is attributed to God. such as the falling of an axe head

- falling lot - a random arrow. &c - Prov
16. 33. Exod. 21. 13. Deut. 19. 5.

356 How does it appear that free voluntary actions are subject to providence?

Thom. Qu. 16. 1. The preparation of the heart and the answer of the tongue are from God.
21. 1. "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water, he turneth it whithersoever he will" Jer. 10. 23 "It is not in man that walketh to direct his steps" Exod. 3. 12. 36 "And the Lord gave the people favour in the sight of the Egyptians." Num 22. 23 chap containing the history of Balaam. - Phil. 2. 13 "For it is God that worketh in you to will & to do of his good pleasure."

357. How many things are included in the doctrine of providence? Conservation and Government.

358. What is meant by conservation and government? The first implies the upholding all creatures in their particular forms, & in their powers of action, & in the actions ^{themselves} them-

The second his superintendence of all things and his leading & directing them to their destined ends. And this includes 1. his fixing certain laws or rules. & 2. his concurrence or cooperation with, & directing the motions of his creatures, according to these stated rules and his own purpose.

359. Is the concurrence of providence with human actions general & indifferant, or particular & directive? Durandus and many of the papists thought that nothing more was necessary than that God should create & uphold the rational agent, without affording any concurrence at the time of action. — The Jesuits maintained that there is a general concurrence, but that this was determined to its particular effect by second causes. But the concurrence contended for by most orthodox divines, consists, 1. in God's giving to second causes their efficiency, 2. in his preserving it, 3. in his exciting & applying

second causes to action & in determining them
to act. 5. in directing them to their appoint-
ed ends. The arguments in favour of this
particular & directive concurrence are
First. Because in the S.P. the effects or actions of
second causes are ascribed to God. Thus He is
said to have sent Joseph into Egypt Gen 45. & The
heart of the king is said to be in his hand &c
He is represented as using the wicked as his
sword rod &c Ps. 10. 15. 26. & 13. 5. We are said in him
to live & move & have our being. Coloss. 1. 17. - Second
Because God is the governor of the world
and therefore all actions external and in-
ternal, good and bad must be subject
to his controul. Third. As the creature has
its being, so also it must have its actions in
God, otherwise the second cause would be
coordinate & independent. Fourth. If God
exercises but a general concurrence it is
vain to pray to him, in regard to any
thing, in reference to which free agents are
concerned. Fifth. He is then no more the

Author of good & evil. But James 1.7
says "Every good & every gift is from above" and
1 Cor. 4. 7 "what hast thou that thou didst not re-
ceive" Rom. 11. 36 "For of him, and through and
to him are all things" Sixth. on the supposi-
tion of a mere general concurrence God could
not be said to ^{direct} the falling of a sparrow or of
the lot, to give rain & snow & winds. or to pro-
vide food for the young ravens &c. &c. Job 37. 38
Psalm 104. 147. 1 Sam. 2. 7. 8. 9 &c. Lastly. this would
render the decrees of God uncertain, and
his foreknowledge fallible, - it would with-
draw the operations of the will from his
dominion - it would make the creature
more efficient than God. - & destroy the prin-
ciple foundation of piety, which is the
dependence of our will to the will of God.
360. What is the difference between moral &
Physical concurrence? Moral concurrence is that
in which he that concurs operates as a mo-
ral cause by persuading or dissuading, of
being or removing object or occasion. Physical

concurrence implies an efficacious and real influence in the production of the effect, by a positive influence.

361. What is the difference between mediate & immediate concurrence? Each of these are of two kinds. *quoad suppositum* & *quoad virtutem*. Immediate concurrence of the first kind is when no other substance intervenes between the cause & the effect, to receive the action of the cause, as when water chills. The second kind is when the cause acts by its own peculiar virtue or power, as when fire burns. Mediate concurrence of the first kind is when some substance intervenes between the cause & the effect, as between writing & the writer. - of the second when the cause acts not by its own virtue, as the shining of the moon.

362. Does the concurrence of the Deity extend only to the preservation of the principle of action or also to the action itself. Funct. time says it extends to both. - God is the

Author & preserver of ^{all} ~~every~~ creatures and give
them all their power and affords them
whatever is necessary to every individu-
al act. but no man knows the mode
of the divine cooperations. All we can
do, is to avoid all opinions which tend
to take away accountability from man
or to make God the author of sin. The
soul is essentially active, acts from its
nature & acts of itself. Dr Alexander.

363. What is the difference between pre-
vious & simultaneous concurrence? An.
Previous concurrence is that by which
God is said to influence causes, to excite
creatures & induce them to act, and al-
so to direct this action to one thing ra-
ther than another. Simultaneous, is
that by which he produces the act as
to its entity or substance. These differ
not essentially from each other, the lat-
ter being merely the former contin-
ued.

264 How does it appear that a previous concurrence takes place in the operations & actions of creatures? First the nature of the first cause & the subordination of second causes. The first cause is the first mover in every action, second causes must be acted upon in order to act otherwise they cease to be second causes. Second. from this, that what is of itself indifferent to many actions to act or not to act, can not be determined, but by some other. Thirdly. When two free causes are united ⁱⁿ to the production of the same effect they either must both be excited & directed to act at the same time by some superior cause, or both from their nature determined to act, or the one must be determined by the other. In the case under consideration the two first can not be admitted therefore the last must or there can be no simultaneous concurrence. Fourthly. if God from eternity

has decreed all these free actions, he must
in time predetermine the will to these actions
otherwise, his decrees might be frustrated.
365 Does not such a concurrence infringe
the liberty of the creature? No. for there
is no physical necessity imposed upon the
will, but it is determined agreeably to
its nature to act. In a separate or divid
ed sense indifference as to the event is
not remove from the will, though it
is as considered united with the first
cause. This motion of God is consistant
with the mode of operating belonging
to the will.

366. Does it not make God the effici
ent cause of all events? The actions of
second causes are said to belong to ^{God} ef
ficenter but to creatures both efficient
et formaliter. & are denominated from
them.

367. How can such a concurrence take
place in evil actions & God not be the

Author of sin? This concurrence extend^{only} to the entity of the act, and not to its character & moral quality. The act itself must be distinguished from its evil which but a circumstance.

368 How can such a concurrence previous as well as simultaneous be reconciled with liberty and contingency? It is attempted to reconcile these in some measure on the following ground, i.e. from the order of the causes among themselves, and from the mode of acting proper to them. Which is explained thus. First the concurrence of Providence & the human will, is not of equal & collateral causes, but of unequal & subordinate. Second God concurs with second causes agreeably to their nature, as his decree is concern both in determining the event & the causes that produce it, so his providence secures the event without violating the native

of those causes. Thirdly this concurrence is rational, & influencing the will that it determines itself. Fourth this concurrence is different in respect to good, & evil actions, in the former it produces both the entity & the moral quality of the act, in the latter merely the entity.

369. Is it possible clearly to understand this subject? ^{See Ap. 13.} It is not, in our present state.

370. Are sinful actions under the direction & government of providence? Yes, and that neither by merely being permitted as Pelagians maintain, nor by being efficiently produced, but in being efficaciously ordered & directed.

371. How many things may be distinguished in sinful actions? Three, 1 The entity of the act. 2 the evil of the act 3 the adjunct of the act i.e the consequent judgement or punishment.

372. What is meant by the permission

of sin? This permission is not moral, as opposed to prohibition, & which implies approbation. But physical, as opposed to production. Secondly it is not merely negative, supposing only a cessation of the divine will & providence in reference to evil actions, but also positive as he not only did not will to prevent sin, but willed not to prevent it.

373. Is sin ever the direct object of the divine will? No. good alone can be the object of the will of God, in regard to sin his will terminates in the permission of it, which is good.

374. Is sin properly speaking a means of promoting God's glory? An. no. it is not a causal or effective ~~of~~ mean of honouring God, but the reverse, tho' it is the occasion, of the illustration of his glory.

375. Why did God permit sin to enter into the world? An. We cannot tell. The

Aminians think one principal reason was, that he did not wish to interfere with the free agency of man.. This permission of sin was not contrary to justice, since he was not bound to prevent it. nor to his wisdom, because the condition of the creature ~~it~~ was mutable, according to his will, he was not obliged to contract or destroy this mutability, Nor to his goodness, since he loved his creatures as long as they retain their integrity. and as he has taken occasion hence, to display, his justice, mercy wisdom & love. This refers to permission of sin at first when creatures were holy, As to its permission among fallen men reasons are evident, 1. as it is a punishment. 2. as it instructs believers in the knowledge of themselves 3. as examples. —

376 Is desertion included in the idea of the permission of sin? Answer

It is, and this desertion is two kinds first
privative, when it consists in the withdraw-
ing of grace before enjoyed, but which
had been abused. Second when it im-
plies only the not affording the grace
necessary to preserve from sin. / Or deser-
tion in another view may be considered
as threefold. First that of trial, to see what
was in man" as was the case in regard
to oldam. Jeremia &c. 2 That of correction
as towards the church. A. 54. 7. B. 12. 3. — 3^d
that of punishment, which is a judicial
desertion. 2 Kings. 21. 14. Lev. 7. 29. Rom. 1. 24.
377. Does God ever employ a positive in-
fluence in the production of evil? An.
Many suppose that besides the permis-
sion & desertion already mentioned, that
there is a certain efficacious operation
in regard to evil, which belongs to the
Holy God. This opinion is grounded on
those passages of S.P. where this agency ap-
pears to be expressed. As when he said to

to have hardened Pharaoh's heart. - To have
commanded Lemai to curse David 2 Sam
16.10. - to have put a lying spirit in the
mouths of the false prophets. 1 Reges 22.23
to give a strong delusion that men
might believe a lie. 1 Thess. 2.11. &c. They con-
fess however their inability to con-
ceive of the mode of this operation, tho
divide into the three following parti-
culars. 1. The offering occasions of sinning
2. delivering to Satan. 3. a certain im-
mediate operation on the heart. And
this may be done by some internal pro-
position of objects by which the will is
moved. or by the impression of thoughts
in themselves good, which the wicked-
ness of men pervert.

378. How is Providence concerned with sin
as to its beginning, progress, & end. An
First as to its beginning, in permission
- desertion - & a certain efficacious appa-
ration of providence. As to its progress.

in restraining it within proper bounds, so
that it should not be ~~more~~ greater in degree
more extensive in its operation, or lasting
in its duration than is for the best. And
this is effect either by an ^{nat.} interillumination
of the mind & repressing of evil principles
or by the external removing of the occasions
to evil & restraining of Satan. — As to its
end, in its wise ordering & direction, so as
out of evil to elicit good. "Ye thought ^{it} for
evil but God thought it for good." see. 110.
5. 6. 7. Job. 1. 20. 21. 22. & Ps. 3. 12. 14. 15.

349. Does not this concurrence with sin, et
not the purity of providence? Not in the
least, any more than the rays of the
sun are defiled by falling on things
impure & corrupt. And though the
same work is often ascribed to God &
Satan or wicked men. yet it is in wide
ly different respects. In one it is most
holy, springing from a holy principle
& directed to an holy end. But in the

other a most evil work in its principle means, & end. - As a Judge may use lions & other savage beasts as instruments of punishment, and a physician things evil in themselves, as means of healing so a Holy God may employ sinful actions for holy ends.

380. Does it furnish an excuse for the sinner? No, as it does not destroy his liberty nor spontaneity.

381. Does not the blame of an action belong to the principal cause rather than to the instrument? This principle holds in regard to homogenous causes. when both are positive & physical, or both privative & moral. as when we say the word ~~it~~ sanctifies. Therefore much more the Holy Spirit. - but not in heterogenous causes. the one being physical or positive the other moral or privative. as, because the sword which slays a man is an innocent cause, it does not follow that he

that used it is also innocent. Second it is true ⁱⁿ regard to entire & irrational instruments, but not in regard to metaphorical or mixed instruments. As the man who spurs a lame horse is not the cause of his limp: &c. But sinners are instruments of the latter kind. Thirdly the axiom is correct when the action of the principal cause is the same morally with that of the instrument, as because the disciple of Pelagius holds erroneous sentiments, therefore Pelagius himself did. but is not correct where the action is not the same morally tho' it may be so materially.

382. Is not the cause of any cause, also the cause of the effects of the last cause? Yes. in regard to adequate causes. when no true & proximate cause intervenes between the thing caused & the second cause. And also in regard to essential & necessarily suborninate causes. as he who caused

The Sun, is the cause of light & heat. But this is not the case where the cause of the inferior cause, is so per se & of the thing caused only per accidens. Therefore though the human will is the cause of sin, & God the cause of the human will, it does not follow that God must be the cause of sin, since the will is not necessarily or per se the cause of sin, but only by defect or per accidens.

383 Does God ever tempt men to sin? Temptation is twofold. The one for trial the other of seduction. The one good, the other evil, in the latter sense James says God tempts no man. When we pray that our heavenly Father would not lead us into temptation it is in reference to the temptation of seduction meaning that he would not deliver us to Satan to be tempted by him to evil. In the former sense he tempts or rather tries all his children.

384. Does not the permission of sin fall under the rule not to do evil that good may come? No, for there is great difference between the doing & permitting of evil.

385. Have any maintained that God was the Author of sin? Yes, some among both the ancient & modern sects. as Triscillian etc. &c.

386 Do they attribute any thing of the blame or evil of sin to him? No, for then they must have believed that God was not a perfect being.

387 How do men abuse the doctrine of Providence in relation to things past? First by murmuring against ^{it} as unjust & in the pious there is often too much impatience, opposed to the humble submission becoming children. see examples of this resignation. in Job. 1. 21. & 9. 10. Ps. 39. 10. Lam. 3. 48. Second by despair. as Cain. which is opposed to that firm trust & confidence the saints should possess.

388. How is this doctrine abused in relation to things future? First by too much confidence & security, leading to the neglect of the proper means for effecting their ends. Second by anxiety & distrust. Thirdly by placing too great or too little reliance on second ^{causes}.

389. What use should be made of the doctrine of Providence? First it should lead to Holiness, because the eye of an holy God, it teaches, is always upon us. ¶ Gratitude in prosperity. ¶ Patience and humility in trials. Ps. 34. 10. Luc 22. 42. 2 Sam. 16. 10. ¶ Repentance & Consolation, in peace & tranquility of mind, as we lie in the bosom of our God assured that all things shall work together for our Good.

Angels

390 By what names are Angels called in the S.P.? Sometimes spirits, at others Seraphim & Cherubim. Also Thrones

Dominions &c. But most frequently they are called messengers from their office; being ministering spirits.

391. How does it appear that Angels are real beings? They are necessary to complete the grade of Being. — 2. This appears from the oracles of the Gentiles, from the apparition of spectres — from the cases of demoniacs. — 3 from the whole of S.P.

392. How does it appear that They are created beings? First from those passages of S.P. where it is said that God created all things, & where Angels are called his host, ministering spirits &c. Secondly it is expressly asserted in Coloss. 1. 16. 17. "By him were all ⁱⁿ things were all things made which are heaven, and that are in earth, visible & invisible whether they be Thrones, or Dominions, or Principalties or powers, all things were made by him. & for him. And he is before all things & by him all things consist."

393. Did the Creation of Angels occur before this world was made? Some divine think they were, others that they were not.

394. Does Moses make any mention of the creation of Angels? No, unless we consider it as contained in Gen. 1. 1 as it is said Gen. 2. 1. "Thus the heavens & the earth were finished & all the host of them."

395. Does not Job 38. 6, 7. imply that they existed before the world? "When the morning stars sang together & all the sons of God shouted for joy" many persons do consider this passage as intimating that they existed prior to our world. But Lurgettine & others suppose it means nothing more than that immediately on their creation they broke out in the song of praise for what they were & what they saw.

396. Are Angels spiritual or incorporeal substances? Yes. as appears first, because in S. S. they are called Spirits & a Spi-

it hath not flesh and bones. 2 because spiritual faculties & operations are attributed to them. 3 were they corporeal more than one could not be in the same place, but a legion was in one man.

397. With what bodies did angels appear? It cannot be easily determined. They were real bodies, but whether they were created for them at the time, or belonged to men then in existence, or compacted from some other matter cannot be ascertained.

398. What sort of knowledge do Angels possess? Angelic knowledge is fourfold.

1. natural such as appertains to them as a grade of being 2 revealed, which God see proper to make known to them.
- 3 experimental which they derive from their intercourse with the world & the church. Epes 3.10. Luke. 15.10
4. Supernatural belonging only to the good Angels. The vision of God &c

399. Do they know future contingencies?
No for these depend on the free will
of God & cannot therefore be known but
by revelation. - This knowledge is repre-
sented as peculiar to God, Is. 41. 22. & 42. 8. 9.
- created intelligences cannot foresee
things as future, but by considering
the causes whence they are to flow, but
the causes of contingencies are indef-
inite.

400. Can they search the heart? No,
for this belongs to God alone, "The heart
is deceitful above all things & despi-
rably wicked, who can know it? The
Lord search the heart. & try the reins."
401. Can they comprehend the essences
of things? No.

402. Is their knowledge noetical or dia-
noetical? Dianoeical, as God alone per-
ceives all truth intuitively. But as
they are so much superior to men, it is
probable the number of self-evident

truths to them, is far greater than to us.

403. Do they possess the power of mutual communication? Yes, they are said to call one to another. Is. 63. recd so Zec. 2. 3. Rev. 7. 2 & 14. 18.

404. Are they endowed with liberty & moral agency? They are, they possess intellect, ^{together with conscience} and the power of choice, which constitutes moral agency.

405. Are they subject to passions and affections? No so far as these arise from a sensitive nature, their loving God hating sin & rejoicing in the salvation of a sinner, are such exercises as belong ^{to} pure spirits, not being mingled with the perturbation which accompanies the operation of such passions in us.

406. What power do Angels possess? Their power though exceedingly great is limited. They can perform miracles of the second class. With respect to ho-

des they can operate upon them in various ways changing their places. & they can also influence & excite the senses internal & external, but they cannot as least immediately operate on the rational soul, otherwise they could read the thoughts.

407. Are there orders, or different ranks of Angels? There is some difference of rank among them, as their different appellations prove, but what this order is we cannot tell.

408. How many Hierarchies or orders do the Papiots suppose? They make three Hierarchies the supreme, mediate, and ultimate, each of these subdivided into three orders making in ^{all} nine grades. In the supreme their place Cherubim Seraphim & Thrones, in the mediate Dominions, Principates, Powers. - Virtues Archangels, Angels. And to each of these they ascribe peculiar offices.

409 Whence did they derive this doctrine?
They receive ^{it} from the writings they
falsely ascribe to Dionysius, ^{the} Areopagite.

410 Were these celestial Hierarchies known
to the Fathers? No, there is not the least
notice of them in any of the early Chris-
tian writers as hence Augustine Cyril.

411. How does it appear that this notion
is vain? Because Paul from whom
this pretended Dionysius says he receiv-
ed the doctrine makes no mention of
it. 2 This threefold division does not em-
brace all the different appellations giv-
en in S.P. to angels. 3 Paul mingles
them all together when he calls them
ministring spirits. — The notion ap-
pears to come from the ^{the} Platonic
school, which divides their Genii in
to supercœlestes, cœlestes & subcœlestes

412 Is Michael a created Angel, or is
he the Son of God? This person is men-
tioned only six times in the S.P.

three in the O.T. viz Dan. 10. 13. 10. 21. & 12. 1. and
three times in the N.T. 1 Thess. 4. 10. Jude 9.
Rev. 12. 7. There are three opinions respect-
ing him 1. That by the name Michael
is always to be understood the Son of God
- 2. That it signifies some created Angel
3. That in some places it signifies the
one & in some the other. The first opini-
on is supported by the following argu-
ments. 1. The name seems to lead to this
sense it may be interpreted "Who is like
that God" or "Who is as that God" 2. The name
is read of more than one Archangel
which seems to indicate that he must
be a divine person. 3. The good Angels
are spoken of Rev. 12. 5 as belonging to
Michael, but they have no Lord, be-
sides Jehovah, therefore the Archangel
is Jehovah 4. He is called "The Great Prince
who standeth for the people of God." see
Dan. 12. 1. who can this be ~~or~~ but Christ.
5. An argument may be derived from

a comparison of Jude 9. with Zech. 3. 1. 2.

b. The ancient Hebrews understood the archangel to be greater than an angel. With them Michael is the same as Mithaton whom they call the chancellor of Heaven, whose name is as the Almighty & signifies two things Lord and Ambassador. This is the Angel by whom alone there is access to God.

The second opinion is that Michael is a created Angel, intrusted with the government of the other Angels, and is supported ^{by these} arguments 1. That Michael & the Archangel are the same is granted on all hands - now the Archangel is distinguished from Christ 1. Thess. 4. 16 "For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the Archangel & with the trump of God" 2. Michael is called Dan. 10. 13 "one of the chief princes" here by princes we must understand

the understand the Angels - the first princes
are the chief angels - but Michael is
one of them & therefore must be of the
same order. 3. An argument is drawn
from Dan. 10. 21. "And there is none that
holdeth with me but Michael your
prince". It is thought this speech would
be very unsuitable of the Son of God
whose power is Omnipotent & whose
help is all sufficient. - 4. An argument
may be derived from this same pas-
sage, thus Dan. relates that he whom
he saw clothed with linen & was the
son of God, which agrees with the dis-
cription given of him Rev. 1. Now this
same person who touched Daniel &
shake soothingly to him, says v. 13 "The
prince of the Kingdom of Persia, with-
stood me one & twenty days when lo
Michael one of the chief Princes came
to help me" Whence it is certain that
the Son of God who speaks & Michael

who is spoken of are different persons
5. It is said Jude q. That Michael does
not bring a railing accusation". It
is argued that this language is not be-
coming as applied to the Son of God.
The advocates of the opinion that Mi-
chael is Christ are Coccius Mitsinus &c.

13. What is the peculiar opinion of pro-
f. Lampe respecting Gabriel? He not on-
ly maintains that Michael is the
Son of God, but that Gabriel is the Ho-
ly Spirit. He says these two symbol-
ical names, are the only names of an-
gels found in the S.P. and that he
who supposes they belong to created an-
gels forget the nature of angels which
is spiritual & they have neither lan-
guage nor voice. If any think that
these symbolical names are not pro-
per names but only names of office
it is incumbent on him to shew that
why these names are given but to two

of the whole choir of Angels. But such things are attributed to Michael and Gabriel, as can only agree with the notion of a Divine Person see. Dan. 10. 16. 17. For how can the servants of this my Lord - but the saints have never been accustomed to profess themselves the servant of Angels - Wherefore nothing can be more probable than that these two names should belong to two of the Hypostases of the sacred Trinity one of whom was sent out to procure and the other to apply salvation. Lampe says that The celebrated Hussius held the same opinion. Moreover Lampe thinks that the two Cherubim over the mercy seat, were intended to shadow forth these two divine persons Michael & Gabriel. Mitsius considers these Cherubim as representing the Angels & L. Parkhurst insists that there are also symbolical indications of the Trinity.

14 Do the *S.* make mention of more than
Archangel? No see answer. 4. 12.

15 What are the employments of Angels?
Their duties are various as they respect
God - themselves - the world - and men.
In regard to God they are employed in con-
stant adoration & praise. *Apoc.* 4. 8 & 9. 11. 12.
and in the most cheerful & holy obedi-
ence "Thousand thousands ministered un-
to him, and ~~the~~ ten thousand times ten
thousand stood before him" *Dan.* 7. 10. They
also adore Christ *Heb.* 1. 6. and ministered
to him while on earth. *Luke.* 1. 42. *Matth.* 2.
4. 16 Why are they employed in ~~the~~ minis-
tering to the church? Not, because there is
any absolute necessity for it, but rather
from the kindness of God 1. To the Angels
themselves, as it confers on them the glo-
ry & delight of being fellow workers with
God. 2. To believers as it promotes their com-
fort. 3. It also tends to unite by the com-
munication of favours. Angels with men

in the bonds of love. & It promotes the good
of the universe, by uniting superior &
inferior beings in duties to each other.
5 But especially it manifests the glory
of God. the end of all things.

417. What kind of a society do they form?
A society of harmony, holiness & love.

418. Is there any reason to believe that
they are instruments in the government
of the world? Yes. Aristotle supposed that
they were employed to rule on the stars.
It appears however that they are con-
cerned in the administration of the pro-
vidence of God, from Jacob's ladder &
from Ps 102. also from Rev. 14. 18 & 15.
And they are sometimes the guar-
dians of Empires &c. Dan. 10 & 11.

They also execute the designs of God to
wards men, evil & good, as in the pun-
ishment of Sodom Gen. 19. 11. of the Egyp-
tians 12. 29. also see 2. Kings. 19. 35 Ps. 37. 36
Dan. 2. 13 & With respect to good men

They are often occupied in teaching or directing them Gen. 16 & 32 Dan. 10. 1 Kings 19.
- in guarding them "The angels of the Lord encamp round about those that fear him", Ps. 34. 8. examples of this frequent, in the ^{case} of Lot. - the three friends of Daniel. see Acts. 5. 19. Luke 16 &.

419. Is there any foundation for the opinion that there are guardian angels?
It appears from the preceding answer that there are often the guardians of the saints.

420. Has every individual or pious person a guardian angel? This is a favorite opinion of the Papists, and there ^{are} two passages of the S. S. commonly brought to support the doctrine. The first is Matt. 18. 10 where the angels of little children are mentioned & the other is Acts. 12. 15. in which Peter's Angel is mentioned. but this last is only the exclamation of his friends in their surprise & not the voice of the

It may however be remarked that this belief is not inconsistent with any ~~the~~ truth of the Bible. - Turnettine's arguments against it are 1. That there is no mention of these particular Canadian angels in the S^c. though so much is said of their ministering to the saints. 2. Because one is said to deliver or protect a great number of persons & or a great many angels to have charge concerning one individual. Is. 37. - 2. Kin. 6. 4-3. Because this sentiment arose from among the Heathen.

421. Do angels act as our intercessors with God? No. for He who intercedes for us can be no other than he who died, our advocate & propitiator are one & the same. 2. To offer the prayers of others to God is a part of the Mediatorial office. & there is but one Mediator between God & man. 3 He only can present our prayers who purifies them. 4

This opinion is derived from the heathen among whom the idea of intermediate Deities was so prevalent.

422. Is worship due to Angels? No - as appears first from Col. 2. 18. Let no one be grieve you of your reward in a voluntary humility & worshipping of Angels.
2. Because Angels themselves reject it as in Rev. 19. 10. & 22. 9. & 3. Because worship belongs only to God. "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God & him only shalt thou serve." Matt. 23. 10. & The object of worship must be omnipresent.

423. Are the seven spirits the mentioned Rev. 1. 4 created spirits? No. but the Holy Spirit. 1. because they are joined with the Father & Son in the invocation. - 2 They are mentioned before the Son not from priority of nature or existence, but their parts in the plan of redemption. Perhaps this appellation is in reference to the 7 churches, or may

contain an allusion to the variety of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

On the Covenant of Nature or of Works

424 In how many states may man be considered? Four as formed at first - as being in sin - as restored by Grace - as perfected in glory.

425 What was the original condition of man? Happy and Holy, thus bearing the image of his creator. Yet under his government & endowed with liberty to act freely.

426 What was the nature of that Liberty with which man was endowed? It was not the Liberty of independence nor of perfect indifference of will. but it consisted in freedom from coercion - from physical necessity - and from bondage either to sin or misery.

427 Is the liberty of man in a state of sin the same as that in the state of

innocence? No, not altogether though it is
essentially. The liberty of Adam consisted
in a ability not to sin. of man in a state
of sin in sinning freely. see Buck. N. Will.
428. Did Adam before the fall possess
the power of believing in Christ? The A-
minians answer in the negative, in or-
der to support their doctrine that a suf-
ficiency of grace is given to every man
to enable him to believe in Christ. For if
Adam had not this, then he never lost
it & therefore ~~in~~ God before he could re-
quire this faith of all men, must ^{bestow} ~~and~~ the pow-
er of exercising it ~~on~~ all. But the argu-
ments in affirmative are convincing. 1.
Adam had strength of believing all God
declared, therefore also the gospel. 2. He had
the power of loving & obeying God & of per-
ceiving truth, which is all that is requisite
to faith. 3. Holy Angels knew by revelation
of the promised Saviour & rejoiced in him.
see. 1. Pet. 1. 11. Eph. 3. 10.

429 Did God enter into covenant with Adam when he was created? Yes, because we find here all that is requisite for a covenant. 1 Parties - 2 conditions. - a promise & penalty. - God being creator must be governor & legislator - man being a rational creature must be subject to this government & law. & as there was a promise given on the part of God in case of obedience on the part of man & a penalty threatened in case of disobedience a covenant was hereby entered into. - This transaction is expressly called a covenant Gal. 4. 24. - The law given to Adam implies a covenant of which the tree of life was the seal. *see Matins C 143*

430 What was the nature of this covenant? It was a mutual agreement or stipulation, in which God promised all good to man, should he prove obedient. It was is called a Legal covenant because its condition on the part of

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man was the observance of the law. Ch. p. 14.

431. How many covenant are there mentioned in *Ps.*? Two. The covenant of Works & the covenant of grace. which was made with Christ as the second Adam, & in him with all the elect.

432. In What character did God transact with man in the covenant of nature? As creator & legislator possessed of unlimited power & goodness.

433. What was the condition of this covenant? Perfect obedience in man & this was general comprising the knowledge, love & worship of God, with righteousness to all around him, & special, consisting in abstaining from the forbidden fruit, in which all was epitomized.

434. What properties were required in the obedience of man? It was to have been sincere, & universal, in degree intense in duration perpetual.

435 What was the sanction of this covenant?
The promise of life & happiness, everlasting, the threatening of death, temporal & eternal. comprehending all manner of evil to which transgression might lead.

436. How can it be proved that the covenant contained the promise of eternal life? First because eternal life was annexed to obedience to the law of works. Levit 18. 5 "Whosoever does these things shall live in them" Matt. 19. 17 "If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments." Secondly because Christ procures eternal life ^{for} us, and that by fulfilling the righteousness of the law. Besides Christ restores, what Adam lost. Thirdly Adam could not have died had he remained innocent, neither could ^{he} continue always on the earth for it would soon have become unable to contain his posterity. Therefore Thus

must have been some other life prepared for him.

437 How does it appear that eternal death was the penalty threatened? Because man was immortal, and the loss of God's moral image being part of the penalty, we have here two great constituents of eternal death. Sin & immortality. Besides if mere temporal death were the penalty of the covenant of works, and eternal death the penalty of the covenant of grace, then the mission of our Saviour has been an infinite evil to all who perish changing their punishment from momentary to everlasting. — This opinion also represents the nature of sin as entirely different under the different covenants. see Dr E Williams' Essay on the
Scripture Law Ch. 5. § 2.

Stals of the Covenant.

438. Whence did the tree of knowledge of good & evil derive its name? In.

Not because it possessed or could impart the knowledge of good & evil, but at first sacramentally, as it was the sign of man's probation & the monitor to warn him, lest he should know evil by experience, as he already knew good, and afterwards from the event as from eating its fruit man learnt how much good he had lost & evil he had incurred.

439 Why was this tree forbidden to man? Its peculiar test of his love, as ^{the obligation to} obedience here did not result from any thing in the nature of the thing prohibited, but from the command of God merely. This was proper also to remind man that though constituted Lord of the world he was not independent, & to by having an external symbol his obedience or rebellion would be rendered more obvious.

440. Why was the tree of life so called? Bellarmine and others of the Papists suppose it derived its name from its inherent power of conferring life. - But like the tree of knowledge, it more probably received its title from its symbolical signification, it being the symbol of mans promised immortality. It was also a type of eternal life acquired & conferred by Jesus. and of Jesus himself who is "the tree of life in the midst of the paradise of God" 2. 7. Rev

441. Had it any inherent power of communicating or preserving life? No except that it might have been very refreshing & nutritious.

442. What was its use? see in an. 440

443. Why was man prohibited the use of this tree after the fall? Because by sin he forfeited his claim to the blessing signified, by this sign. - The phrase lest he eat & live forever may

refer to Adam's folly in expecting life from eating what had been prohibited.

444. If man had continued in obedience would he have been translated to heaven? It is most probable he would.

445 What became of the earthly paradise? Many of the Papish writers believe it to be still in being in some unknown land, & that Enoch & Elijah are there, whom they consider as the two witnesses who are come against Antichrist. For this however there is not the least foundation. It no doubt suffered the common destruction by the waters of the deluge, if it had not long before that period ceased to be distinguishable.

Sin.

446 By what names or words is sin expressed in the original languages. In hebrew by חטא which properly signi-

fies" a missing the mark." The greek a
μαρτια from ἀμαρτανω has much the
same meaning.

447 What is the simple idea of sin? An
"want of conformity to the divine law"

448 Is sin a mere negative of good or
has it something positive in its nature?

It does consist in privation, but this
privation is corrupting, so that sin im-
plies a positive as well as a negative
evil, as sickness is more than the ab-
sence of health.

449. Is sin a substance or a quality?
A quality it has no real or essential
existence.

450. What is the guilt of sin? Guilt is
the obligation to punishment for pre-
vious transgression. This obligation may
mean desert of punishment, or
actual exposedness to it. Hence guilt
is of two kinds the one inseparable from
sin, the other removed by remission.

451. Is ill desert or demerit included in the idea of guilt? Not in all senses of the term guilt. Sin may be considered either in reference to the command or precept ^{of the law.} - or to its sanction or annexed threatening. From its connection with the first of these it derives its demerit *avopia*, From the second its guilt. In those who are renewed there remains this guilt of demerit, but not of exposedness to punishment. where as Christ had the last without the first. Ps. 53. 5. 2 Cor. 5. 21. 1. Pet. 2. 22.

452. Is guilt removed by pardon? Actual guilt is, but not guilt of demerit.

453. What is the stain or pollution of sin? It is one of its effect on the being that sins, by which the soul is infected, In regard to this, sin is called a plague a disease, a wound.

454. Is there any foundation for the distinction between the guilt of the fault

and the guilt of the punishment? ~~by~~
The first is that by which the sinner is
unworthy of the favour & deserving the con-
demnation of god. - The second is that
by which he is exposed to punishment
& obligatal to endure it. The Papist say
that the latter of these may remain tho'
the former be removed by christ. which
is certainly improper since no liability
punishment can continue if all fault
be taken away.

455. Is the death of believers a part of the
penalty of the law? No. it, as well as the
pains & afflictions of the present life are
consequences of sin, but are intended ra-
ther for correction than satisfaction. It
is mercifully ordered that believers should
die as well as others for the death of an in-
dividual would then be to all to who
witness it, a certain proof of his perdi-
tion. It would also anticipate the work
of the judgement day, were believers ex-

empted from death.

456. Is there any ground for the distinction of sins into venial & mortal? None, there are no venial sins as is proved 1. from Rom 6.23. The wages of sin are death" & The soul that sinneth shall die" Azech 18.20. - 2 because it is written "cursed is every one who continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." Deut. 27.26 - 3 Whosoever offendeth in one point is guilty of all" James 2.10. - 4 Because every sin is an offence against an infinitely perfect being & therefore an infinite evil. - 5 Christ died for all our sins, therefore all must be mortal.

457. Are all sins equal in malignity & guilt? No, this was the opinion of the ancient Stoics, but is evidently paradoxical.

458. What was the sin of Angels by which they fell? There are several opinions on this subject, the two principal are first, that it was envy of man, whom it is sup

posed they knew by revelation was in
christ to be exalted above them. - The second
is that it was pride, which is the most pro-
bable of the two, since Paul in 1 Tim 3. 6
says "lest being puffed up with pride he
fall into the condemnation of the Devil"
- and we know that Satan is continually
striving for the dominion of this world
ofo which he is called the God 2. Cor 4. 4.
- and pride too was the sin to which
he tempted Adam. Perhaps become^{ing} ~~he~~
then remiss in contemplating the divine
perfection, his attention was turned from
God to himself, & admiring his powers
conceived too high a love for them which
rose to pride & eventuated in rebellion.

459. What was the precise nature of the
first sin of man? This must not be consid-
ered as any simple or particular sin, but
as a general apostasy from God, including
the violation of the whole moral law, as
it implies, unbelief & contempt of the divine

command, ingratitude, pride, & profanation of God's name. and moreover, want of proper affection to his posterity, as by that act he ruined both himself & them & also intemperance sensuality & theft. Hence appears its enormity. The commencement of this sin may be placed in want of consideration, of the interdiction of his creator & also of his truth & goodness. - then incredulity in the threatened punishment - next, crediting the promises of Satan, then corrupt desire of the fruit & then pride & rebellion. Hence it appears that the first step belongs to the understanding & that error preceded transgression.

460. How can it be accounted for that innocent man should sin? It is very difficult to account for the entrance of sin into a holy mind. Yet the mutability in which man was created, suppose the possibility of his fall: the true cause

of his sinning is found in the freedom
of his will, which was capable of being
so influenced by satan that man should
freely depart from God. But we must
not consider man even in his unreasoning
state as a simple being, but as possess-
ed of all those appetites & passions be-
longing to uncorrupted nature. These
will exert a constant influence on the
will, which renders care necessary that
they gain not the ascendancy. Thus the
appetite of hunger might operate on the
will of a person perfectly holy & crave
for indulgence, under circumstances
where the satisfaction of it would be im-
proper. Is it wonderful that a being
thus constituted should be led astray?
This however is the greatest difficulty
attending the system of those who con-
sider the will as determined by motives.
The Arminians in giving the will a self-
determining power, avoid the difficulty.

461. Was the first sin owing to man's being deserted of God? The term desertion seems to imply some previous offence in the person deserted, & therefore is not so proper as negation. Since no grace before given was withdrawn from Adam but God having at first bestowed what was sufficient to enable him to stand, saw proper not to give what was requisite infallibly to prevent his fall.

462. Could this sin have been avoided? It was certain in regard to the decree & providence of God, but contingent in regard to Adam. The event was certain though the cause was free.

463. Could God have prevented it consistently with man's freedom? Yes, by having imparted a greater degree of grace, if this were not the case then the will of man is ~~being~~ beyond the empire or dominionⁱⁿ of God. which cannot be.

464. Did Adam lose the image of God by the first sin? Yes. for it was a complete Apostacy or turning from God as his chief good - it was not a particular sin but a violation of the whole covenant & law. - because spiritual death was the penalty of the law. - & because man is now born corrupt which proves that Adam lost the image of his creator.

465 How could a single act destroy all holy dispositions? By its great enormity - or by the penalty attached to it, as every sin deserved banishment from communion with God. - besides there was something peculiar in this sin as it violated the covenant.

467. Was the first sin of Adam imputed to all his posterity? It is. Though this doctrine has ^{been} rejected by the Pelagians Remonstrants Socinians & many others. Some among the orthodox to avoid some of the difficulties pressing

ing this opinion made the distinction
of imputation into immediate & medi-
ate. This was first done ^{by} Placcus, who
defines immediate imputation to be
that, by which the sin of Adam is di-
rectly imputed to all ~~th~~ his posterity,
Christ excepted, as well in the privation
of original righteousness, as exposedness
to eternal death, & that simply because
they are his children, - antecedent to
inherent corruption. - mediate im-
putation arises from a view of the
hereditary corruption derived from
Adam, of which we all partake and
to which we all habitually consent &
are therefore considered as participa-
ting in the sin of Adam.

468. Is this imputation mediate or
immediate? Immediate. as the ~~word~~
imputation is but a simple idea the
phrase mediate imputation is hard-
ly correct.

469. How can this imputation be reconciled with Justice? Wherever the action of one person is imputed to another it must be on account of some bond of union between them. - This may be of three kinds - natural as exists between parents & children - 2 moral or political as between kings & subjects - 3 voluntary as between friends. The two first of these constituted Adam our representative in whose conduct it then became just that we should be involved. That he was considered as the representative of ^{his} posterity appear 1. from the nature of the covenant existing between him & his creator - 2 from the image of God which he received as belonging to his nature to be preserved ~~or~~ lost not only for himself but for those who should partake in his nature. - 3 from the community of punishment between Adam & his posterity - 4 from the parallel be

tween Christ & Adam.

470 By what arguments is it demonstrated? It is proved 1. from Rom. 5. 12. "As by one man sin entered into the world & death by sin, so that death passed on all men for that all had sinned" This death includes spiritual death which has passed on all men, therefore all men must have been accounted sinners previously. — 2 from 1. Cor. 15. 22. "In Adam all died" then in Adam all must have sinned — 3 from the sins of parents being visited on their children Exod. 20. 5. see examples in Achan Jos. 7. 24. 25. Amalekites, Sam 15. 2. sons of Saul & many others. — 4 from the propagation of sin; for if the sin of Adam be not imputed how can we account for the pollution & depravity of Adam being communicated to his children. — 5 from Adam's being not only the natural but also the moral head

of the human family, in whom they would have been holy had he remained so, & by whose fall they were made sinners. — 6 if we deny the imputation of Adams guilt, we must also deny the imputation of Christs righteousness. since the Apostle makes them to stand on the same ground.

471 What is original sin? Augustine made original sin to consist in concupiscentia or irregularity of our desires — Anselm in inclinatio justitiae Scotus united the two which is correct. That is, original sin, is the destitution of original righteousness, together with positive corruption, belonging naturally to all mere men from their connection with Adam.

472. How do you prove the doctrine of original sin? First from Gen 6.5 "Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart are only evil continually" — 2 from

Job. 14. 4. "Who can bring a clean thing
out of an unclean" - 3 from Ps 51. 5
"Behold I was shapened in iniquity &
in sin did my mother conceive me"
- 4. from John 3. 6 "For that which is born
of the flesh is flesh." - 5 from Ephes 2. 3.
"And were the children of wrath," ^{by nature} even as
others - 6 from Rom 5. 12. "For by one man
sin entered into the world & death by
sin" - 7 from the necessity of universal
death - redemption - regeneration - sancti-
fication & from the law of nature that
every offspring should be like its parent.
from experience universal corruption
requires that there should be a princi-
ple of evil equally extensive.

473 Is the substance of the soul corrupted
by sin? No, this was the opinion of Jac-
cins Illyrius, in order more effectually
to prove the imbecility of the human
will in conversion. But this cannot be
the case, because God created & does will

produce every substance which must therefore in essence be pure - because The S. S. distinguishes between sin & the sinner - because were this correct Christ in assuming our nature must have taken our corruption, & man after his sanctification would be essentially different from what he was before.

474. How is original sin propagated? An. It is impossible to say. There are two answers given to the question. The one general that it is by impure generation. - The other more particular placing it in the conception of the body which must be unclean & corrupted - 2 in the creation of the soul destitute of original righteousness that is simply not pure neither holy nor corrupt - 3 in the constitution of the man by the union of this negatively pure soul with a polluted ~~for~~ body; which as some say is like an impure vessel tainting the pure liquid that may be poured into it.

475 If the soul be created pure how can it be consistent with goodness or justice to connect it with a polluted body? The soul is formed in the body & never had a separate existence, they from the first moment of their existence constitute the human being that fell in Adam & therefore justly inherit both his sin & corruption. - "Who art thou that darkenest council by words without wisdom?"

476 How is actual sin divided? First in relation to its object as God or our neighbour - 2 in relation to its form as of commission or of omission - as sinful in its self or only in its mode / per accidens / 3 4 in relation to its principle or source as of ignorance or of knowledge - of infirmity or of maliciousness - 4. as merely resident or as reigning - as remissible or as unpardonable.

477 What is the sin against the Holy Ghost & why is unpardonable? Answer.

It is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit
not merely a sin of the heart, but one
completed by words. Turretine makes
it to consist first in sinning against
the knowledge of the truth, & this knowledge
must not only ^{be} theoretical & historical
but also founded in conviction. — 2^d
in a total apostacy from the truth, con-
nected with a malicious rejection and
denial of it, and this not from the fear
of death or desire of gain, but from ha-
tred & condesc. pt. — 3 an obstinate oppo-
sition to the truth, such as that of the
Pharisees & Julian the Apostate who
even when dying exclaimed "Vicisti Galilai"
— 4 a confirmed perseverance in the sin
to the end. — This sin is unpardonable
not from any deficiency in the mercy of
God or the merit of Christ, but because
it is impossible that those who commit
it should be renewed unto repentance
Heb. 6. 6. and without repentance there is

no forgiveness. This impossibility of repentance perhaps can only ^{be} accounted for by saying God has seen fit to determine that it should be connected with this enormous crime, committed against the Holy Ghost by whom alone, we are enabled to repent or believe.

478. Can sin be the punishment of sin? Yes, though sin that is actually sin is no part of the penalty of the Law. It may however be, either its own punishment, or that of some preceding transgression, or of the sin of some other person. - This proved First from 2. Sam. 12. 11. 12 Where the sin of David is said to be punished by that of Abolam. - 2 from Rom 1. 24 &c. where God is said to have delivered up the Gentiles to vile affection on account of their Idolatry. - 3. from 1. Reges 22. 20 where a spirit of false ~~phar~~ prophecy was sent forth, a great sin in those who received it, at the same a greivous punish

ment to them & the nation. — & from
those passages of L^d in which the punish-
ment & the crime are represented as uni-
ted in the same act, — as in the decep-
tion of the ten Tribes — in the oppression
of the people by the Assyrians & a punish-
ment of one & a sin of the other. — in the
numbering of the people — the hard-
ness of Pharaoh &c. see also 2 Thess. 2. 11.

On The Will.

479 What is the Will? According to Locke "The Power or ability to prefer or choose" according to Edwards "that by which the mind chooses any thing" & according to Dr Reid "A power to determine to do or not to do, things which we conceive to be within our power"

480 In what variety of meanings is the word used? It is employed in great or less extent by different persons. Sometimes it is used to express all the active powers of man, in distinction from his intellectual powers: thus it is used when the powers of the mind are classed under two heads Will & Understanding. The word will is also employed to signify both the faculty and the act, though the latter is correctly expressed by the word volition. The definition given by Dr Reid "a determination of the mind to do or not"

is the most exact & best corresponds with the common use of the word, for we may prefer one of two things when we will neither. I may prefer the life of a sailor to that of a soldier though I may not will either of them. I choose that my pupils should be conducted themselves properly, but I cannot be properly said to will it. The faculty of will belongs to all sentient active beings other animals as well as man.

§ 81. What does every act of volition imply? That we had the power to have acted differently or not have acted at all. Necessarian volition is a contradiction in terms. If we are under the necessity of doing a thing there is no choice, and of course no volition. This power of acting or forbearing to act is properly the liberty of the will. Every man is conscious of this freedom & therefore no arguments can destroy his conviction of it.

that he possesses it. The mule possess this liberty though ⁱⁿ a more confined sense than man. When the stable door is open the horse is at liberty to remain in his stall or go out to pasture. Liberty therefore does not constitute an accountable moral agent. Reason & Conscience with liberty are necessary to make a creature capable of a moral law. The degree of responsibility will be in proportion to the strength of our rational powers. We are as certain as we can be of anything that we are the authors of our own actions & therefore feel that we are accountable for them. It ought not to be & is not as far as I know a matter of dispute whether the mind makes its own determinations. They who maintain the selfdetermining power of the will & they who insist on the influence of motives, equally agree in this.

482. What is the direct object of volition?

1 The direct object of volition is some action of our own. 2 It is some action which we believe to be in our power. However much a ~~many~~ man may desire to fly, he never wills it, nor any thing he believes to be impossible. Thus we see there is a clear distinction between will and desire.

483. Are will and desire ever opposite?
It has been a question whether these two things may be opposite in relation to the same object. Mr Locke & Dr Reid maintain the aff. President Edwards the neg. The proper answer seems to be, that the will may be contrary to many desires which relate to its object, but never opposite to the prevailing desire. A man who is urged to eat of a certain dish may desire to comply with the solicitations of his friend, and he may also desire to eat because he has a strong relish for the food. but he will not do

eat because he believes it would injure his health. Now the will in this case opposes several desires, yet is coincident with the desire of health & ease which prevails over the rest. Though will has for its direct object our own actions of mind or body, yet it may be some distant action. I may will to go to such a place or to do such a thing a year hence.

484. Do we ever will what we believe to be out of our power? No, the object of our volition must be some thing which we believe to be in our power & to depend upon our will. A man may desire to make a visit to the moon, but he cannot will or determine to do it, because he knows it is out of his power.

485. What determines the will? The will is determined by the active principles which exist & prevail in the soul our nature when the volition is made.

And according to this view, our volitions are produced by principles in our own souls & are as much our own as they can be on any other hypothesis.

486. How many theories are there on this subject? Five 1. That the will determines itself - 2 That the mind or soul determines it. 3 That it follows the last dictate of the understanding. 4 That the will is invariably determined by the strongest motive then in the view of the mind. - 5 That the will is determined by divine agency, which is the efficient cause of our volitions but in the view of motives. - The great objection to the word "motives" is that it is ambiguous. It is often used to signify the same with reasons, external objects suited to our inclinations. A man is said to have strong motives for doing a particular action when the reasons in its favour are cogent. A great

sum of money is said to be a great motive to induce a man to swerve from the truth & justice. but if there be no love of money it is no motive at all.

487 Is indifference essential to the liberty of the Will? By indifference is meant an equilibrium in which the will is without any antecedent determination or bias to one side or the other, that the determination ^{itself} may be entirely from it self & owing to its power & sovereignty. — And here we observe that to support this scheme of liberty, the indifference must be perfect & absolute. There must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the will be already inclined before it exerts its sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself. — Here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth: "that every free act is done in a state of

freedom and not only after such a state.
If an act of the will be an act in which
the soul is free, it must be in a state of
freedom & in a time of freedom. It will
not suffice that an act immediately fol-
low a state of liberty: liberty must con-
tinue & coexist with the act. For the very
notion of a free act of the soul, is an act
in which the soul uses or exercises liber-
ty. Now the question is whether the soul
of man ever puts forth an act of the will,
while it yet remains in a state of liberty
- that notion of a state of liberty which
implies a state of indifference? Or whe-
ther the soul ever exerts an act of choice
or preference, while at that very time the
will is in a state of equilibrium, not in-
clining elining one way more than
another? The very putting the question
is enough to shew the absurdity of the
affirmative answer. For how ridiculous
would it be for any body to insist that

The soul chooses one thing before another when at the very moment it is perfect & is indifferent with regard to both. This is the same thing as to pass the soul from one thing to another at the very same time it has no preference. Choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest. Motion may be the next moment after rest; but cannot co-exist with it, in any even the least degree. Choice may be immediately after a state of indifference, but has no co-existence with it even the very beginning of it is not in a state of indifference. Therefore if this be liberty no act of the will is ever performed in a state of liberty or in time of liberty.

488. Does liberty properly belong to the will? Liberty in common speech, is power, opportunity or advantage, that any one has to do as he pleases. Now liberty

cannot properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but what has such a faculty, power or property, called will. For that which is not possessed of will cannot have power of doing according to its will. And therefore to talk of liberty belonging to the very will itself is not to speak good sense. For the will itself is not an agent that has a will. That which has the power of volition is the man or soul & not the power of volition itself. Liberty is a freedom from restraint. In the popular sense of the word it means that we can act agreeably to our choice but in this sense it does not respect the will, but the power of acting consequent on volition. It is doubtful whether liberty can be predicated of the will itself, as volition cannot be the effect of restraint. — The truth is choice supposes the power of embracing one of two or more things. each of which is in our

power; the freedom of the will relates to these objects. A man has an opportunity of riding, walking, or sitting still. He chooses to ride. There is freedom & no constraint as in his volition, for he might have refused to ride. Liberty as applied to the will therefore properly expresses the idea which belongs to every volition, that he might have chosen something else— But in the controversy on the freedom of the will some apply the word ~~no~~ liberty to the cause of volition. Volition is said to be free because the motives which ~~the motives which~~ persuade us to choose may be resisted. If we conceive a motive so strong acting on the will, that it cannot be resisted, there is an end of liberty, & in proportion as the motives approach to irresistible force, in the common sense of men the action is in the same degree excusable. Now this is an important point & deserves serious con-

sideration. Certainly the doctrine stated above is not universally true; for then the more wicked a man's heart, the more excusable his crimes; & vice versa, than which nothing can be more absurd. But in regard to motives of a particular sort, there is some foundation for the opinion; & it is important that the distinction should be accurately made. I would therefore lay down the following proposition.

1. Every determination of the will is the effect of some affection, active principle, of some affection, appetite, sense or inclination.
2. Some of the active principles that govern the will are sudden and impetuous & act before there is time for reflection.

A man whose temperament is constitutionally irascible, receives from some one a blow in the face which produces instant pain. In a moment he feels there is time for reflection his anger is enkindled & his will is powerfully de-

terminated to strike the person from whom
the blow came. This volition is produced
instantly, before he has time to consider
consequences & to reflect that the injury
was undesigned. Now this passion of an-
ger seems to have been bestowed upon
animals to lead them to defend them-
selves against sudden assaults, and in
man it precedes the exercise of reason
& in proportion as the passion was sud-
den and violent, in the common sense
of men, the person is excusable for the
act produced. The sin in this case con-
sists in not guarding against the ris-
ing of passion, and in suffering it to con-
tinue when we have time to reflect. All
his motives which are not so sudden in
their operation are never the less violent
& difficult to be resisted, as hunger and
thirst, desire of rest after great fatigue &
the desire of deliverance from excruciating
pain. Now if by any voluntary act.

these can be removed the will is constantly
pressed to determine on the act. If there
be no counter motives, this volition will
immediately take place, as in animals
who have no motives of any other sort.
But if cannot ^{we} obtain relief without com-
mitting an immoral act, there will
then be a struggle between those princi-
ples & affections which influence us to a-
void moral evil & the strong cravings
of these natural appetites. Now the vir-
tue of resistance in these cases is mea-
sured by the strength of the appetites
to be overcome, & the sin of yielding by
the same rule. But this is true only in
regard to those natural & animal
propensities or passions which act with
a blind influence on the will. Yet these
are never strictly speaking irresistible
if. They are never so strong but that prin-
ciples of piety may be strong enough
to resist them. — But with respect to
^{counteract}

passions which are in their own nature sinful - They cannot excuse. The stronger they are the more sin. And whether we determine to act or not, their very existence is sin. Sin does not require an act of the will to bring it in to being.

489. Is the will always determined by the state of the soul immediately antecedent? Dr Reid says "That in all important determinations of the mind there must be something in the preceding state of the mind, that disposes or inclines us to that determination". If such an influence have any share in the business, it may as well be considered as decisive: for if the latter be inconsistent with liberty so is the former & perfect indifference would alone be consistent with liberty. It is true that the active principles of our nature incline us to a certain act according

to the force of these principles. But after all the mind determines and this determination of the mind we call volition.

490 Has the will a self determining power? To prove that the will has no self determining power Pres. Edwards observes, That it must do this in the exercise of a power of willing, & therefore every free act of choice is determined by a preceding act. choosing the act and this requires an ~~pre~~ceding act of choice preceding it & so on ad infinitum. Now this appears to me ~~a~~ to be a specimen of metaphysical quibbling. A faculty in order to exert itself must not be first supposed to act that it may act. The same reasoning will prove that the soul cannot act at all. For it may be said that the soul cannot act without exerting its power for this purpose but the exertion of power is acting and

requires a preceding exertion to produce it & so on ad infinitum. How causes operate to produce effects we know not. How active beings are the cause of action we know not. But this we know that ^{where} there are effects there must be a cause. It is in vain to search for any thing intermediate between an active being and an action. And as a faculty operates in a peculiar way agreeable to its nature & powers without supposing any thing intermediate between the faculty & its operations. — But as to the question Does the will determine itself? It cannot be intended whether an act of the will determine itself. This would be making volition both cause & effect. An act supposes an agent. — a volition, a capability of choosing. But there is an evident absurdity ⁱⁿ supposing that the act or volition determines itself. I suppose therefore by the

~~fore by the~~ will determining itself, is meant
that the faculty of will determines the
volitions; and by the will is understood
all the active powers of man or of the
soul there is nothing absurd in the doc-
trine. — The answers to this & the pre-
ceding question may be correct but
they do not reach the difficulty. The
question returns what enduces the mind
to make the determination? Is it reg-
ulated by the ~~the~~ temper, inclination
propensities or appetites which form
the state of the soul antecedent to
the act, or is it sovereign & arbitrary?
Sometimes coincident with this existing
state of mind & sometimes opposed
to it.

49. Is the will always determined by
the last act of the understanding? Some
maintain that it is, or that the will
always follows the last practical judg-
ment of the understanding. There is

at least some obscurity in this answer
There may be many judgements of the
understanding of its relation to the
same subject or action viewed in dif-
ferent aspects. One judgement may be
that the action is morally wrong. Another
that it tends ultimately to my ruin
& a third that it will afford me pre-
sent pleasure. Now here are two judg-
ments unfavourable to the action &
one in favour of it, & yet this one may
prevail. If it be meant that previ-
ously to determining on this act, my
judgement must be that upon the
whole it is best; this is not true, for
I may have an intimate conviction
that upon the whole it will be hurt-
ful. But if I prefer present pleasure
to greater permanent good, is it ^{not} my
practical judgement that this tempo-
rary gratification is to be preferred
to ~~this~~ distant good. & do I ~~not~~ there-

for view it as the best.⁹ The only difficulty here arises from compounding judgement with inclination. I am most inclined to seize the present pleasure & therefore I choose it & determine on it: but it cannot be said correct ly that my judgement or understanding decides that it is best. I may be deeply convinced that I am sacrificing a great though distant good for a gratification of no real value, but appetite or passion is strong & has been accustomed to be indulged therefore I yield. - As every act of the will must have an object & as it belongs to the understanding to apprehend objects of every kind, so it follows that every act of the will must be preceded by some operation of the intellect. In this sense the will always follows the understanding, but this has no bearing on the subject, for when I deter-

mine that which I refuse is in view
of the understanding as well as that
which I choose. — It seems to me there-
fore to say that the will always fol-
lows the last practical judgement
of the understanding is not true, or
it furnishes no satisfactory answer
to the question. — The will of man is
sometimes spoken of as the moral
part of man's nature, & it is true
that in all moral acts the will is
concerned, but so is the understand-
ing also. But if it be meant that the
will is moral in all its acts, it is a
great mistake. The will is often exer-
cised where there is nothing moral as
any other faculty. There is nothing
moral or immoral in choosing a
peach in preference to an apple. It
is an act of the will by which I lift
up one foot before the other, but there
is nothing moral in this. If all acts of

The will be moral then every animal has a moral nature. for every animal has will. The acts of children before reason is in exercise would be moral, for they exercise will — The will in a large sense may be considered as the seat of moral actions. But in this sense it includes the exercise of Reason & Conscience for let man be deprived of reason and the morality of the exercise of his will ceases. A madman can perform no moral acts. Every act of the will which is of a moral nature supposes and includes the exercise of reason. — Pres Edwards says "that in some sense the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension & not merely what is called judgment or reason. If by the dictate of the

understanding is meant. what reason declares is most for the person's happiness taking in the whole of his duration it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the "Understanding".

492. Is the Will determined by the strongest motive? Here two questions require to be previously settled. first What is meant by "motives," and secondly What constitute the strength of a motive. — Mr Edwards defines a motive to be "every thing that moves, excites or invites the mind to volition" Again every thing that is properly called a motive "has some degree & sort of tendency or advantage to move or excite the will" That which has a greater degree of tendency is called the "stronger motive" & that which has the less the "weaker motive" "Whatever is a motive must be extant in the

view or apprehension of the understanding." This seems to be accurately and correctly stated. But when we come to consider what these are which have a tendency to move or excite the ~~mind~~ will, we find a good deal of explanation necessary. Those things which have a tendency to move the will consist commonly of an object external & a desire, inclination or appetite for that object. Now it ought to be considered that an object external however excellent intrinsically has no sort of tendency to move the will unless there be some inclination to it. The whole strength of motives depends on the strength of these internal affections appetites or inclinations. Food is placed before me; if I have no appetite or wish for it, the food is no motive for me to eat. It exerts no power - sends forth no influence &

has no tendency to determine my will
But if I am hungry, the food being
suited to this appetite, I feel strong ten-
dency from the cravings of this appe-
tite to take the food & eat it. Impro-
perly it may be said the food indu-
ces ~~me~~ me to eat, but strictly it is
this internal desire. Now if no con-
trary inclination or appetite oppo-
ses the act of the mind ^{it} will inevita-
bly be determined. But suppose I
am informed that there is poison
mingled with the food, however
great my hunger I will not eat. be-
cause the desire of living & the fear of
dying are sufficient to counteract
the desire of food. Or suppose I am for-
bidden to eat by some one whom I am
under obligations to obey, — suppose I
cannot eat without violating my
conscience & offending a superior. My
decision now will depend on my desire

to keep a good conscience & the fear and attachment I feel towards this superior. Suppose again that this food will injure my health, & that by waiting sometime I can be supplied with some that will be wholesome, & that this is the only consideration or motive to counteract the appetite & the disposition. The determination will then depend upon the strength of the appetite & the disposition I may possess to prefer a greater though distant good to a present gratification. The doctrine of the strongest motive prevailing is true if we mean by motive not the object but the desire of the object, which is in the mind itself & thus we come to the old conclusion that the mind determines its own volitions.

493. Can there be volition without motive? Here Dr Reid asserts two things

which appear to me to be incorrect
First the mind often wills without
any motive. & secondly that it often
wills contrary to the strongest mo-
tive. — He divides motives into ra-
tional & animal. & considers the con-
test to between these two sorts of mo-
tives, in common cases. Now as this
last distinction is a radical princi-
ple in his system, we will first consid-
er it. Animal appetites solicit us to
do a certain act, They impell us by
a blind impulse. The understanding
is no otherwise concerned in their op-
eration than as it apprehends the ob-
jects of these propensities. But on the
other hand reason decides that the
act which we are solicited to perform
is injurious or is inconsistent with
duty. Here are two influences but of
entirely different kinds. The mind
determines between them by a sov.

reign act and thus is free & master of it-
self. This if I mistake not is a fair view
of Dr Reid's opinion. But I would an-
swer that reason considered by itself
can never be considered as a motive to
action. If there were no active princi-
ples in the mind inclining it to em-
brace the objects reason brings to view
the strongest reasons would never con-
trast the gentlest cravings of appe-
tite. I have no objection to this distinc-
tion of motives into rational & animal
may I think it correct: but rational
motives suppose rational principles in
our nature i.e. active principles guid-
ed by reason. And when there is a con-
flict between animal & rational mo-
tives, the determination will depend
on their relative strength, & though the
mind determines & determines free-
ly, yet this determination is produced
by the antecedent state of the mind

as it regards the force of these opposite motives or principles. For example a man is urged to eat or drink something he knows will be injurious to him. The influence on his will is direct & urgent, but as he has reason and experience he foresees the distant consequence & determines not to comply. Now I ask had this man no regard to his health & comfort would ^{he} refrain? Is it not obviously his strong desire of health that prevails over the craving of appetite? Again if a certain fruit be forbidden by our Creator - of appetite & other animal desires urge to eat & we refuse because it is forbidden by such a Being, - Is not the determination produced by fear of offending, or the love we have to holiness? If there were no such principles would mere reason however clear have any effect? I think not.

494. What advantage would occur from the power of willing without motive or contrary to the strongest motive? Suppose a man the temper of whose soul is virtuous - he loves his Creator and fears to incur the accusations of his own conscience. These are his strongest motives in the moment when by passion or appetite he is solicited to transgress, but exerting his power of will he determines against the strongest motive to violate his duty. Is such a power a perfection of his nature? Is he more accountable for such an act than if produced by habitual malignity? Dr Reid himself admits that in all important determinations of the will there is something in the antecedent state of the mind which leads to them. If we choose sometimes without motives & sometimes contrary to all motives. such a choice must be very in

rational and such a power very inconsis-
tent and dangerous. A man has no in-
clination leading him to possess his neigh-
bour's property; but a strong desire to act
~~un~~justly & yet he wills to steal some-
thing within his reach - suppose such a
volition in such circumstances, is the man
accountable for it? He might say I
know not whence this volition proceeded
there is nothing I am persuaded in my
principles, or in the antecedent state
of my mind which could have pro-
duced such a determination, for I am
habitually averse to every thing of the
kind. - it must be attributed to the
extraordinary power I have of willing
without motives & contrary to them. If
it be said that we never will without
motives but in trivial cases, then cer-
tainly such a power is of little conse-
quence. And the reason why Dr Reid
thinks he wills without motives often is

every day, is because the acts are of too little consequence to engage his attention & the motives pass unnoticed or make no impression on the memory. Dr Reid says that if a man could not act without a motive he would have no power at all" also "that any action done without a motive can neither have merit or demerit is a self-evident proposition" he says moreover "if we may act without motives this power may enable us to act against the strongest in compliance with the weaker" but on acknowledged principles such an act would have neither merit nor demerit & therefore of no consequence.

495. All things being the same precisely both external & internal can the volition be different? This is the ultimate question respecting the will. Supposing all motives & circumstances external & internal to be the same, with the same

person at different times, is it possible that the volition might be different. If a man has a strong appetite for intoxicating liquor in a place where it is offered, and at the the time his disposition to reflect - and his fear of God & the consequences of sin are too small to counteract this restless appetite, so that he is led to drink to intoxication. Suppose at another time the motives & circumstances precisely the same would he act differently. Those who would decide in the affirmative ~~by~~ might say that the man at one time calls up & exercises a resolution in resisting evil, which at other times he does not - that we are conscious of such power - that often the mind rejects thoughts & objects the most pleasing by virtue of this inherent power - now these things are true but the question still is what induces the mind to exert its power in resistance? Is it a blind in-

considerate act? or does the importance
of acting well & the bad consequence of yielding
to temptation so strike the mind at
this moment above what it did before
that it becomes resolute in resisting evil?
The latter is undoubtedly true. But sup-
posing such a person, by such a power
in varying our volitions, in precisely
the same circumstances, I ask what
privilege or advantage this gives to
man above what he is supposed to have
on the other Theory? no other than this
that he may without reason or motive
have acted differently from what he
has done. The other theory supposes a
power of changing, but connects this
change with an alteration in the views
& inclinations of the mind at the mo-
ment. But if the volitions of the mind
will always be the same in the same
circumstances, how does it happen
that we are conscious that we have

done wrong - that we could have acted differently; but the question returns Does not this suppose a different state of the soul antecedent to the action? A man regrets that under the influence of passion he reproached his friend. He is conscious he could have avoided it. But how? By such considerations as would have moderated his anger. or if he had taken a moments time to think of the consequences. Thus we shall find in every case in which we believe we could have acted differently we suppose a change in the antecedent state of the mind.

496. What would be the effect of equal motives? It is argued correctly that the motives being the same the volition will be the same also. But have we not power to change the influence of motives by directing our thoughts to other objects. Undoubtedly this is the

case, but it has no direct bearing on the question. For changing the direction of our thoughts is the effect of volition & we are led to it by some motive that did not exist, or at least not in the same force before. A man has been overcome once & again by a particular temptation; the consequences have been distressing to him; he is assailed again by the same temptation, it operates on him as before, but recollecting the pain & evil has brought on him he makes an exertion to change the direction of his thoughts, he calls in solemn considerations & the snare is broken. Divine grace more commonly helps us in these cases - The power which the mind has over the tracing of our thoughts is limited. Sometimes we cannot exclude certain thoughts from our minds we can only introduce others & that with difficulty. A man who

is on the rack or in a fit of the gout cannot exclude the thoughts of pain nor a hungry man the thoughts of food from his mind. — The consequence of equal motives coexisting in the mind would be, that no act of the will would take place. But such a case never did or never can occur.

497. Is there a proper distinction between animal & rational motives? There is & on one account very important. Animal motives consisting in ~~more~~ ^{various} natural propensities seated in the ~~in~~ body, act blindly and urge the will by a certain force which is proportionate to their strength. Now this influence may be so powerful as to render it extremely difficult to oppose it, & in proportion to this difficulty the guilt of complying will be ~~increased~~ diminished. For example. The desire of relief from racking

pain is one of the strongest we experience. If a man tortured on the rack has deliverance offered him upon condition of his speaking some false word or performing some improper action, the motive is not irresistible or his guilt would be annihilated: but in proportion as it approached an impossibility to resist, his guilt in yielding is diminished. The same is the case with all other animal motives. But the strength of rational principles or affection of the mind in their nature evil, so far from lessening the cause of guilt which is in proportion to their strength. The animal motives are in their nature indifferent. The others partake of a moral nature in all their stages.

498. Can they be compared as to their strength? ^{or} There may be as just a comparison between animal & rational mo

tives as between any other. Rational motives contravert to what Dr Reid supposes affect all the active principles of the mind, as well as the judgement, & as much so as animal motives. Therefore they may be compared as to their relative strength. Dr Alex.

499 Can mere reason ever be a motive to volition? Dr Reid says it can. By reason he means that calm cool principle which has an influence on our action directly contrary to passion, or mere animal motives. Animal appetites impell us by a blind impulse. Reason decides what ends are most worthy of being pursued, & how far appetites & passion are to be indulged & when they are to be resisted. — But I would reply that reason considered in itself can never be considered as a motive to action. If there were no active principles in the mind leading us to embrace the objects

reason brings to view, the strongest reason would never counteract the weakest animal motive. Pres. Edwards says that reason is one of the ingredients of the compound motive influence which moves & inclines the will, that it is one thing to be estimated in considering the degree of the appearance of good which the will always follows. When it concurs with other things its weight is to be put into the scale, but when against them it is a weight in the opposite scale when it resists them, yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight, so that the act of the will is determined in opposition to reason." And of course men reason can never be a motive to volition.

500. What is it that ultimately determines our volitions to be what they are? The answer to this question will best appear after recapitulating what

has been said on this subject. 1 Strictly
the will is a determination to exert our
power over our mind or body & is lim-
ited by the supposed power which we
possess. I will to sit - to stand - to walk
I will to think of former scenes - to
collect what I have learned &c. - 2 Will
in a larger sense is choice or preference
I prefer a free to a despotic government
I choose a mild climate rather than
a severe one. But the term will is not
so properly used here: for I ~~could~~ not
say I will a free government or mild
climate. These things not being within
my power. - 3 Will is used again
to signify all the active powers, as when
the faculties of the soul are distinguished
into understanding & will - Will
belongs to all animals & in them is
regulated & determined by animal
propensities. Where there is but one
propensity the volition is inevitable

when there are two or more the strongest prevails. 5. Will in man is influenced by animal propensities as in inferior creatures. But he being endued with reason & conscience, has other principles of action, & has also other natural desires. He can more-over compare and reflect & consider, but when he determines, his will is coincident with the antecedent state of his mind. - 6 The power which determines the will is not an act of the soul, but in it. External motives & reasons have no force when they do not derive from the temper & inclinations of the soul. The soul therefore determines its own acts & will but according to its own nature or the prevailing inclination at the time of making the volition. This makes us as much masters of our volitions as by any other hypothesis. For if we could determine to act contrary to

all our principles it would only be
a power to act absurdly. Such an ac-
tion could never be good though the
matter of it be correct. Every volition
must have an object. Therefore the ex-
ercise of the intellect precedes that
of the will; but the will does not fol-
low the last dictate of the under-
standing, but contrains to this yields
itself to appetite which it finds is
most agreeable to indulge, but at the
same time knows that it is rejecting
the greatest good. The will is not there-
fore as the greatest apparent good in
view of the understanding: unless
the mere strength of appetite is
made the criterion of the degree of
good. No acts of the will are neces-
sary: for necessity & liberty are incom-
patible. Yet the connexion between
volition & its causes is certain. - Dr
Watts & Dr Reid advocate the doc

trine of the will's self-determining power. Mr Lake & Pres Edwards The opposite & correct doctrine that it is determined by motives.

The two cardinal points in this subject are. 1 Our volitions are produced by ourselves. 2 The motives of them exist in our own nature. — These are necessary to make man a free agent.

Simple Intelligence & Defiance -
Spontaneity & Disobedience -
Deception & Persecution
General & particular
Benevolence & Complacency -
Ordinate & absolute -
Supernatural, natural & moral
Absolute & permissive -
Permanent & transient -
Essence and accident -

Inspiration &c -
Duty of H. B. -
Elementary Principles

F. H. B. -
G. H. B.

